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iv   
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis analyses the international music industry supply chain. The descriptive 
background presented entails publishing rights, the vertical integration of the historical 
music industry, the historical position of the artist, and follows the evolution of the digital 
technology, distributive production, and peer-to-peer file sharing networks in order to 
build a prescriptive model which addresses the following three research questions.  
Given the revolution in technology in the music industry where do the Majors fit? 
What is the positioning of the artist in the new digital technology? And given the change 
of position of the Majors and the positioning of the artist what are the descriptive and 
prescriptive possibilities should the Majors disappear and be replaced by alternative 
elements in the music industry supply chain? 
The present study considers the Music Industry as the trade of prerecorded music 
in any format and assumes responsibility regarding the results presented up to July 2009. 
This thesis considers the four Majors as being part of the Music Industry rather than an 
absolute representation of the industry itself. Also this dissertation’s primary concern is 
the bundling and unbundling of the music industry’s supply chain and not the bundling of 
products within that supply chain.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The advent of the Internet and peer-to-peer (P2P) software programs for 
exchanging music via the Internet is having a significant impact on both the supply chain 
for music and the dominance of the big record labels also known as the Majors. The 
physical product, such as a CD, is being replaced by a digital product which can be 
distributed via the Internet. According to Alexander (1994), new digital distribution 
technologies threaten to undermine the prevailing structure of the industry by facilitating 
the free exchange of digital music files between consumers with computers and internet 
connections1.  As Leyshon (2001) puts it: 
 
“Software formats have elicited a conservative, critical response, a discourse 
founded in the existing social and technological hierarchies of the industry. 
Meanwhile, on the other hand, software formats have been welcomed by others 
precisely because they are seen to be a means to dismantle the industry’s 
established hierarchies and power relations. Although in opposition to one 
another, these two positions at least agree upon one thing: that the rise of software 
formats such as the MP3 will bring about the end of the music industry as it is 
currently configured”.2  
 
No one knows at this stage where this revolution in technology is going to lead 
the long established music industry, yet  three major implications for the music industry 
can be observed. The first implication is that the physical distribution chain will become 
less and less important. The second is that the “big four’s” stranglehold on the music 
                                                
1 Alexander, P J. (1994) Entry Barriers, Release Behavior, and Multiproduct Firms in the Music 
Recording Industry, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.9, pp.85–98. 
2 Leyshon, A.  (2001)Time-space (and digital) compression : software formats, musical networks, and the 
reorganization of the music industry, Environment and Planning A, Vol.33, pp.49-77. 
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industry is likely to lessen as 1) other players find it easier to enter the market and 2) the 
rise of music piracy creates a shift in revenue streams forcing the record labels into new 
directions and new strategic positioning. The third implication views the positioning of 
the agent responsible for the value-added quality within the music supply chain; namely 
the artist, which is a key point of this dissertation.  
This thesis analyses the international music industry supply chain. The descriptive 
background presented entails publishing rights, the vertical integration of the historical 
music industry, the historical position of the artist, and follows the evolution of the digital 
technology, distributive production, and peer-to-peer file sharing networks in order to 
build a prescriptive model which addresses the following three research questions.  
Given the revolution in technology in the music industry where do the Majors fit? 
What is the positioning of the artist in the new digital technology? And given the change 
of position of the Majors and the positioning of the artist what are the descriptive and 
prescriptive possibilities should the Majors disappear and be replaced by alternate 
elements in the music industry supply chain? 
 
1.1 The shift of power in the music industry 
For the major record labels who dominate the music industry, piracy is a life and 
death issue. Their profits come from their ability to control the supply chain for music 
from artist to consumer. If consumers can download for free and pirates can copy CDs 
and sell them on the street, the day of the major labels is effectively over because they 
cannot recover the costs of developing and promoting artists and recording their music. 
However, this need not be the case for the artists themselves; only a very few make any 
money out of selling records, and even for them 85-90 per cent of the revenue goes to 
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their record labels. It is now possible for these artists to sell their own music directly 
through their Web sites and alternate e-commerce platforms such as Amazon.com or CD 
Baby. Even if the overall revenue from their music dropped by 90 per cent, they would 
still receive as much money or more than they did under revenue agreements with the 
majors.  However, it is perhaps the music consumer who benefits most  from the advent 
of the Internet. Even if consumers  pay for legal downloads through a subscription 
service, these service appear to be getting increasingly less expensive.  If consumers 
choose to download illegally, they get the music for free. Therefore, it is not just the 
structure of the music supply chain which is being transformed, but the balance of power 
in the industry. It can be argued that the major labels are losing some, or even most, of 
their influence, however the artists also have new alternatives to signing with the major 
labels, and the consumer appears to have more choice at less cost.3 
1.2 Research design 
In order to address the three research questions previously stated; two sets of 
literature reviews have been necessary with respect to  1)  industry structure and 2)  
intellectual property rights. Also, in designing this research program, it has been 
necessary to investigate several different methodological approaches.. First, an empirical 
approach is utilized to present updated results based on data collection from IFPI 
(International Federation of the Phonographic Industry).  
Secondly, the computational modeling tool known as social network analysis is 
utilized to build upon previous research on the music industry’s supply chain as well as to 
form novel descriptive and prescriptive models. Finally, scenario planning is combined 
                                                
3 Graham, G. Burnes, B. Lewis, G. Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 24, No 11, pp.1087-1103 
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with social network analysis in order to present alternative models and lead research on 
the music industry supply chain to a new frontier. 
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2 Technological change 
 
2.1 Bundling 
 Managers talk about their key activities as “processes” rather than as “business” 
because most of them assume that the two activities ought to coexist.4 Nearly a hundred 
years of economic theory supports the conventional wisdom that the management of 
customers, innovation, and infrastructure must be combined within a single company. If 
those activities were to separate, the interaction and transaction costs required to 
coordinate them would be excessive,   ultimately forcing those companies to do 
everything themselves in order to avoid such costs. 
Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that when a vertically integrated industry goes 
through a major change such as the one experienced by the music industry with the 
digitization of music it opens the door to the profitable creation of many new specialized 
companies. The advantages of the generalist (Majors) –size, reputation, integration- 
begins to wither. The new advantages–creativity, speed, flexibility- belong to the 
specialists (Independent labels and the Artist).5 They explain that interaction costs 
represent the money and time that are expended whenever people and companies 
exchange goods, services, or ideas.6 They go on to explain that when the interaction costs 
                                                
4 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review.  
5 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review. 
6 The authors believe that the term interaction costs is more accurate than the common term transaction 
costs. Transaction costs, as economists have defined them, include the costs related to the formal exchange 
of goods and services between companies or between companies and customers. Interaction costs include 
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of performing an activity internally are lower than the costs of performing it externally, a 
company will tend to incorporate that activity into its own organization rather than 
contract with an outside party to perform it. All else being equal, a company will 
organize in whatever way minimizes overall interaction costs.7 
Interaction costs have been popularly used in the development of a general 
network theory for social sciences.  This approach has been used to illuminate the 
shaping of networks and the interactions within them. The same set of concepts can be 
applied to the world of outsourcing to illustrate the overheads associated with adding 
incremental supplier/vendor relationships to an existing set of dynamics for an 
organization. 
 Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that the arrival of the digitization of music 
dramatically reduced interaction costs in the music industry and that changes in 
interaction costs can cause entire industries to reorganize rapidly and dramatically. 8  
Also, because electronic commerce has such low interaction costs, it is natural for Web-
based businesses to concentrate on a single core activity-whether it just being customer 
relationship management,  product innovation, or  infrastructure management. 
 Working from this assumption, large companies have, in recent years, expended 
substantial energy and resources in reengineering and redesigning their core processes. 
For many companies, streamlining core processes has yielded impressive gains, saving 
substantial amounts of money and time, and has  provided customers with more valuable 
products and services. 
                                                                                                                                            
not only those costs but also the costs for exchanging ideas and information. They thus cover the full range 
of costs involved in economic interactions. For more about the implications of falling interaction costs see 
Patrick Butler et al., “A Revolution in Interaction”, The McKinsey Quartetrly, 1997, No.1. 
7 Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New-York.  
8 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review.  
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Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith, and Zilibotti (2004) affirm that many experts believe 
that recent technological developments and globalization are transforming the internal 
organization of the firm. They present two views which are of interest in the present 
study. First, they explain that that new technologies, especially information technology, 
are creating a shift from the old integrated firms towards more delayered organizations 
and outsourcing. Second, they explain that “it is often maintained that the greater 
competitive pressures by both globalization and advances in information technology 
favor smaller firms and more flexible organizations that are more conducive to 
innovation”.9 However, the economics profession is still far from a consensus on the 
empirical determinants of vertical integration in general, and about the relationship 
between technological change and vertical integration in particular. 
Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith, and Zilibotti (2004) argue that “vertical integration 
in this world does not automatically improve efficiency. Instead, by allocating the 
residual rights of control to the producer, who has ownership and thus control of the 
assets if there is a breakup of the relationship, vertical integration increases the 
bargaining power of the producer, and encourages its investment. However, by the same 
mechanism, it also reduces the ex post bargaining power and the investment incentives of 
the supplier. Non-integration, on the other hand, gives greater investment incentives to 
the supplier. Consequently, vertical integration has both costs an benefits in terms of ex 
ante investments, and its net benefits depend on whether the producer’s or the supplier’s 
investments are more important for the output and success of the joint venture”10. 
                                                
9 Acemoglu, D, Aghion, P, Griffith, R, and Zilibotti, F. (2004) Vertical Integration and Technology: 
Theory and Evidence, Harvard Business School.  
10 Acemoglu, D, Aghion, P, Griffith, R, and Zilibotti, F. (2004) Vertical Integration and Technology: 
Theory and Evidence, Harvard Business School.  
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Therefore the framework presented by Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffith, and Zilibotti (2004) 
highlights that backward vertical integration gives greater investment incentives to the 
producer, while forward vertical integration encourages supplier investment. 
            Why, then, would the Majors also seek to horizontally integrate if they already 
own more than 80% of the industry? We have to consider that these large companies are 
also competing against each other. To do this, they must each find an unconquered niche 
within the music industry and try to secure it for themselves. They might do this by 
specializing in one genre of music such as country music or by conquering a new market 
in a new country. By buying all the labels in a certain genre or by establishing another 
distribution channel in a rising market, these huge companies can maintain a competitive 
advantage over their competitors. The record companies are making the profits, and by 
owning more parts of the supply chain, they can make even more profits by narrowing 
the costs of production. 
According to Acemoglu and al. (2004); the two leading theories of vertical 
integration are the “Transaction Cost Economics” (TCE) approach of Williamson 
(197511, 198512) and the “Property Right Theory” (PRT) approach of Grossman and Hart 
(1986)13 and Hart and Moore (1990)14. The TCE approach views vertical integration as a 
way of circumventing the potential holdup problems, and thus predicts that vertical 
integration should be more common when there is greater specificity, increasing the costs 
of holdup.  
                                                
11 Williamson, O. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free Press, New 
York. 
12 Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New-York.  
13 Groosman, S. and Hart, O. (1986) The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, pp.691-719.  
14 Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol.98, pp.1119-1158.  
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The Property Right Theory approach, on the other hand, focuses on the role of 
ownership of assets as a way of allocating residual rights of control, and emphasizes both 
the costs and the benefits of vertical integration in terms of ex ante investment incentives. 
Considering a relationship between a supplier (upstream firm) and a producer 
(downstream) and supposing that only two organizational forms are possible where 
vertical integration (backward) occurs when the downstream producer buys up the 
upstream supplier and has residual rights of control, and non-integration (outsourcing) 
which occurs when the producer and the supplier are different firms.  
 Over the last two decades the “Transaction Cost Theory” has emerged as a major 
paradigm in the academic literature. Perhaps the most influential statements about this 
theory have been made by Williamson (197515, 198516) inspiring literature regarding the 
configuration of organizational form, diversification, vertical integration, foreign direct 
investment, joint ventures, and business-level activities.  
 Williamson (1981) explains that: 
 “…transaction cost analysis is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
organizations that joins economics, organization theory, and aspects of contract 
law. It provides a unified interpretation for a disparate set of organizational 
phenomena”.17 
 
Transaction cost theory can be considered as the basic theoretical framework that 
analyzes the relation between the service provider and the customer process; thus, the 
theory embeds and governs both sides of the process. Therefore, with reference to the 
efficiency aspect of the service,  transaction cost theory not only represents the link 
                                                
15 Williamson, O. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free Press, New 
York.  
16 Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New-York.  
17 Williamson, O. (1981) The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 87, No.3, pp.548-577.  
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between those two processes but it also offers an explanation of why they have to be 
understood as a single comprehensive process entity.18 
 The proposition that the transaction is the basic unit of economic analysis was 
advanced by John R Commons in 193419. Commons recognized that there were a variety 
of governance structures with which to mediate the exchange of goods and services 
between technologically separable entities. He conceived that “assessing the capacities of 
different structures to harmonize relations between parties and recognizing that new 
structures arose in the service of harmonizing purposes were central to the study of 
institutional economics”. 
 However, bundling into a single corporation inevitably forces management to 
compromise the performance of each process in ways that no amount of reengineering 
can overcome.20 This has been the strategy carried out by the Majors in the music 
industry. Hagel and Singer explain that :“…speed, not scope, drives the economics of 
product innovation. Once a product innovation business invests the resources necessary 
to develop a product or service, the faster it moves from the development shop to the 
market, the more money business makes.”21 
 There are other reasons for this vertical integration besides increased market 
share. These mammoth conglomerates in the music industry known as the Majors have 
over the  the past 100 years created a tightly secured network by purchasing forwards and 
backwards in the supply chain, buying new labels, manufacturing companies, and 
distributing companies. Their established distribution systems have become highly 
                                                
18 Williamson, O. (1981) The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 87, No.3, pp.548-577.  
19 Commons, J. (1934) Institutional Economics, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.  
20 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review. 
21 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review.  
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elaborate and expensive creating a barrier to entry within the industry. No small firms can 
enter and compete because it is too difficult to get established to compete against the 
Majors. Therefore, the Majors maintain a competitive advantage by being able to 
dominate and sometimes even manipulate the industry. 
 This phenomenon can be explained by the idea of increasing returns in the 
economy which has its roots in the conventional economics presented by Alfred Marshall 
in his “Principles of Economics”22, in which he suggests that firms that get a good start in 
a market often retain their leading position and shut out other companies. Brian Arthur23 
follows up on this insight and notes that whereas the traditional theory based on 
diminishing returns applies to resource-based sectors of the economy,  increasing returns 
apply to knowledge-based industries that require large initial investments followed by 
cheap incremental production once sales start. The author finds this separation as a 
possible explanation for the fact that the theory of increasing returns has been overlooked 
in the past: high technology industries are a relatively recent part of the economy, 
although economists24 have found the positive-feedback mechanism in areas that did not 
involve technology since 1950s.   
Arthur (1994) builds an analytical process-dependent model that explains the 
extent to which small events determine the selection of one of the many possible paths of 
development, emphasizing the theoretical benefits of determining the timing and 
direction of policies that can lock economies and firms in optimal alternatives or dislodge 
                                                
22 Marshall, A. (1890) Principles of Economics, First Edition. 
23 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
24 Gunnar K. Mydral and Nicholas Kaldor. 
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locked-in structures.25 The Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski26 strong laws are used to 
build a theoretical model that explains the dynamics of industry location under 
agglomeration economies, in a framework that assumes that firms benefit from the local 
presence of other firms, and their succession of choices is influenced by historical 
accident. On a historical-accident-plus-agglomeration basis, this model investigates the 
way the agglomeration economies determine a locational pattern and the degree to which 
history is responsible for this pattern. The authors show that when there is no bound to 
the economies of agglomeration, the industry will cluster at a single location -New York 
City in the case of the Music Industry- depending on the accidental sequence of choices, 
whereas if there is an upper limit, combinations of historical accidents can induce the 
formation of one dominant cluster at a single location or, on the contrary, locational 
dispersion.27 The locational shares are determined by an expected motion effect that 
derives from locations’ relative attractiveness and current agglomeration pull, and also by 
a perturbation effect that develops from the randomness in entry succession. Both 
elements become less important as the industry grows, such that the locations’ shares 
settle down as the industry becomes large.28 
In the case of bounded economies of agglomeration, the monopoly of one location 
does not occur with probability one, and there is positive probability that locations will 
share the market. If firms with preferences for different locations arrive evenly in the 
                                                
25 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
26 Arthur, B. Ermoliev, Y M. and Kaniovski, Y M. (1985) Strong Laws for a Class of Path Dependent Urn 
Processes, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Stochastic Optimization, Kiev, Munich, 
Springer-Verlag. 
27 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
28 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
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sequence, there may be more than one location that will dominate if the regions have 
reached their upper bound before a single site got ahead and shut out others. Arthur 
proves that in the case of increasing and bounded agglomeration economies, (in the limit) 
as the industry becomes large, one set of locations from the collection of potentially 
dominant sets will take 100 percent of the industry with probability one, and each of 
these sets will have a positive probability of being the monopolizing set. Locations in the 
monopolizing set share the market as if no agglomeration economies were present. The 
monopolizing propensity of  increasing returns is in this case overcome by even a small 
degree of heterogeneity. One of the two extreme cases that Arthur mentions is the 
situation where agglomeration economies are too weak to cause any monopolizing of the 
industry by subsets of locations (the agglomerations economies cannot overcome the 
heterogeneity of preferences). Another extreme is the situation where conditions (such as 
clustered preferences and strong agglomeration economies at the outset) determine the 
monopoly of a single location even though the economies of agglomeration are bounded.  
The author remarks that economies of agglomerations can also cause the 
separation of an industry, in instances where locations with large numbers of firms cast 
an “agglomeration shadow” in which settlement does not occur. A location that receives 
more firms will also increase its agglomeration shadow, shutting out more neighbors and 
expanding the domain of tastes from which it receives other firms. In the bounded 
agglomeration case, this means that neighboring locations cannot share an industry, but 
sufficiently separated regions can. The selection of regions that receive more firms and 
the ones that are orphaned depends again on historical accident. An interesting 
conclusion is that concentration of an industry does not necessarily reflect agglomeration 
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economies; it may just be the result of homogeneity of needs. The existence of 
agglomeration economies is not enough to determine the monopoly of one location.29 
The author refines the discussion on the lock-in effects of increasing returns in a 
chapter that reexamines the allocation and recontracting processes as they occur in 
economics. In  international trade theory, the self-reinforcing mechanisms occur in the 
establishment of a product’s manufacturing in a certain country. In spatial economics, 
Arthur shows the impact of increasing returns and agglomerations economies on 
locational patterns. Also, with regard  to industrial organization, Arthur supports Katz 
and Shapiro’s work30 in finding multiple market equilibria determined by network 
externalities and expectations. Other areas of economics in which  self-reinforcing 
mechanisms take place are neoclassical growth theory31 (Solow 1956), and aggregate 
macrodynamics32 (Heal 1986) with Walrasian dynamics.33   
The process of industry location is explored by Arthur (1985) through the 
contrasting of three models that take into account the degree to which history counts. The 
pure necessity model considers that new firms of different types decide “at birth” for one 
of N locations, and are not affected by the presence of other firms at any location (the 
preferences are independent). Chance events (the sequence of firm types entering the 
industry) are important in the beginning, but are averaged away as the industry becomes 
large. History has no influence on the outcome, which is dominated by necessity. A 
                                                
29 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
30 Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1985) Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, The American 
Economic Review, Vol.75, Issue 3, pp.424-440.  
31 Solow, R M. (1956) A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics.  
32 Heal, G. (1986) Macrodynamics and Returns to Scale, The Economic Journal.  
33 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
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second model in which chance events are important assumes spin-offs that stay at the 
parent’s location. Firms are added to locations with probabilities equal to the proportion 
of firms in each region, thru a Polya process. In this pure chance model, industry location 
is highly path-dependent, and the proportions which the industry will settle to are 
unpredictable. The third model of chance and necessity combined under economies of 
agglomeration presumes that firms gain geographical and also agglomeration benefits. In 
this case, if a mixture of chance and geographical attractiveness determine the ability of a 
region to get more firms than others, its position is enhanced. 34 
 Let us now consider the positioning of the artist in regard to the big record 
companies and how their relationship has evolved. A theoretical framework regarding the 
relationship of these two agents can be explained with the “Principle-Agent Theory”. In a 
principle-agent situation, the agent chooses an action "on behalf of" the principal. The 
resulting consequence depends on random states of the environment as well as on the 
agent's action. After observing the consequences, the principal makes a payment to the 
agent according to a pre-announced reward function, which depends directly only on the 
observed consequence.35  
 According to Grossman and Hart (1983) this last restriction expresses:  
“the fact that the principal cannot directly observe the agent's action, nor can the 
principal observe the information on which the agent bases his action. This 
situation is one of the simplest examples of decentralized decision- making in 
which the interests of the decision-makers do not coincide. If  this  action-reward  
situation  occurs  only  once,  I  shall  call  it  a  short-run principal-agent  
relationship. The situation can be naturally modeled as a two-move game, in 
which the principal first announces a reward function to the agent, and then the 
                                                
34 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
35 Grossman, S J and Hart, O D. (1983) An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, Econometrica, Vol.51, 
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agent chooses an action (or decision function if he has prior information about the 
environment).”36  
 
 Finally, Radner (1985) explains that the Nash -or perfect Nash- equilibria of such 
games are typically inefficient, unless the agent is neutral towards risk. In this sense there 
will typically be another, unrealized reward-decision pair in non-equilibrium form that 
yields higher executed utilities to both players.37 
 
2.2 Unbundling and re-bundling 
 Under the pressures of dealing with non-standardized copyright laws, global 
competition, and advancing technology, many industries and the music industry in 
particular, are already fracturing along the fault lines of customer relationship 
management, product innovation, and infrastructure management. 
 The major record companies are in the process of unbundling but are not ready for 
re-bundling quiet yet. As infomediaries rise to power, many traditional companies will 
find themselves cut off from their customers. There is a serious threat that new 
technologies may bring to bear on existing music technologies through the process of 
substitution, creating a possible shift in power. What causes some representatives of the 
music industry to worry less about this aspect of globalization is the simple fact that the 
major conglomerates own pretty much every sector of the entertainment market. If any 
such changes should occur, they might actually prove more beneficial than harmful to 
these huge powerhouses. 
                                                
36 Grossman, S J and Hart, O D. (1983) An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, Econometrica, Vol.51, 
pp.7-45. 
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Lam and Tan present the new distribution channel as a threat to do away with 
intermediaries in the traditional distribution channel.38 They add that with this new 
business model and thanks to the Net’s low entry barriers, new entrants in the music 
industry are outpacing traditional record labels, which have limited experience with new 
technologies. Also, they explain that as more consumers go online to shop for music, key 
players in the music industry must reexamine their value proposition to remain relevant.  
Lam and Tan also inform us that online retailers may assume some traditional 
roles of brick-and-mortar retailers. Such online retailers have established a strong 
presence in the music industry through aggressive promotion and a track record in 
fulfilling Internet orders at minimal costs, allowing them to adopt a competitive pricing 
strategy. They insist that the increased visibility of the Net in the music industry may 
rattle the pole position of record labels. 
 Also Lam and Tan (2001) explain that record labels are realizing their lack of 
technological expertise and therefore are striving to form alliances with Internet and 
media companies to encode music in secure standards so as to battle piracy39 which is a 
form of re-bundling. 
 Indeed, the Majors seem to be re-bundling by creating alliances with new service 
companies such as P2P service companies, supply chain management companies, digital 
distribution companies, mobile phone companies, social networking sites, and media and 
broadcasting companies.40 
                                                
38 Lam, C K.M. and Tan, B C.Y. (2001) The Internet is Changing the Music Industry, Communications of 
the ACM, Vol.44, No.8.  
39 Lam, C K.M. and Tan, B C.Y. (2001) The Internet is Changing the Music Industry, Communications of 
the ACM, 44, .No. 8. 
40 See Chapter 6.1 for model, analysis and further discussion. 
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  Supporting this argument, Jean-Francois Hennart (1988)41 explains that 
multinational enterprises are no longer stuck in their rigid insistence on forming alliances 
via wholly owned subsidiaries. He argues that the increasing importance taken by 
domestic and international joint ventures (JVs) has spawned new theoretical and 
empirical work. Hennart attempts to show that Williamson’s transaction costs framework 
can provide a unifying paradigm which accounts for the common element among these 
seemingly dissimilar JVs. 
 Huygens, Baden-Fuller, Vander Bosch, and Volberda (2001) suggest that the 
“search behavior drives co-evolution through competitive dynamics among new entrants 
and incumbent firms and manifests itself in the simultaneous emergence of new business 
models and new organizational forms” (Figure 1). They explain that the exploration of 
the music industry at the industry level was a matter of “explorative search by innovators 
and early imitators for distinct capabilities”42. Via a multiple-case study they conclude 
that record companies managed to adopt a “strategic choice perspective”43 which 
“enabled them to shake off old habits and routines, and to renew their search for novel 
capabilities through radical processes of organizational change, eventually resulting in 
the creation of new organizational forms and business models”. They also point out that 
“interaction patterns among rivals and path dependencies at individual firms can have 
both a positive and negative impact on the development of new capabilities. Interactive 
behaviour through acquisitions, joint ventures and strategic alliances among record 
                                                
41 Hennart, J-F. (1988) A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol.9, pp. 361-374.  
42 Huygens, M, Baden-Fuller, C, Van Den Bosch, F A J, and Volberda, H W. (2001) Co-evolution of Firm 
Capabilities and Industry Competition: Investigating the Music Industry, 1877-1997, Organization Studies, 
Vol.22/6, pp.971-1011. 
43 Child, J. (1972) Organizational structure, environment and performance: The role of strategic choice, 
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companies speeded up the capability development process at these firms”44. Finally, they 
mention that although it was beneficial to the individual firms in their struggle to conform 
to the new competitive rules, it also pushed the industry into more intense levels of 
competition. 
 
 
Figure 1. An integrative framework of co-evolution of capabilities and 
competition.45 
 
 The music industry is moving from a product-based to a service-based industry, 
which is pushing the major music companies to change in order to remain competitive.46 
The Firm’s ability to reinvent itself and to innovate depends on a range of factors. These 
factors include financial resources, geographical location, and industry differences. 
                                                
44 Huygens, M, Baden-Fuller, C, Van Den Bosch, F A J, and Volberda, H W. (2001) Co-evolution of Firm 
Capabilities and Industry Competition: Investigating the Music Industry, 1877-1997, Organization Studies, 
Vol.22/6, pp.971-1011. 
45 Huygens, M, Baden-Fuller, C, Van Den Bosch, F A J, and Volberda, H W. (2001) Co-evolution of Firm 
Capabilities and Industry Competition: Investigating the Music Industry, 1877-1997, Organization Studies, 
Vol.22/6, pp.971-1011. 
46 Kusek, D and Leonhard, G. (2005) The Future of Music, Boston, Berklee Press. 
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 Carlson and Stankiewicz (1995) argue that firms have different levels of 
economic competence, meaning that firms differ in the knowledge they have and how 
they use it. Further, they define a firm’s economic competence as the sum total of its 
abilities to take advantage of business opportunities47. According to Normann (2005), the 
acquisition of and dependency on knowledge, competence, and capabilities will be 
essential for firms adapting to a changing music business landscape.48 
To summarize, Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that “the secret to success in 
fractured industries is not just to unbundle, but to unbundle and rebundle, creating a new 
organization.49 However, they mention that rebundling is a very different process from  
vertical integration because companies will be focusing on a single activity leading them 
to achieve horizontal integration. 
 Also, Hagel and Singer (1999) discuss key changes in the computer industry; in 
particular, that by conforming to a set of well-documented standards (something which is 
missing in the music industry, especially when coping with intellectual property rights), 
companies could, for the first time, easily work together to produce complimentary 
products and services. According to Hagel and Singer, the consequence of this 
possibility, would be the formation of tightly coordinated networks of specialized 
companies  which would lead the new firms ultimately to compete effectively against the 
currently entrenched majors, which are vertically integrated giants .50  
                                                
47 Carlson, B and Stankiewicz, R. (1991) On the Nature, Function, and Composition of Technological 
Systems, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol.1, No.2. 
48 Normann, H. (2005) Digital Distribution of Music: The role of networks and knowledge in the 
Norwegian recorded music industry, Faculty of social Sciences at the Oslo University, Norway, 
Globalization, Innovation and Policy. 
49 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review.  
50 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review.  
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 According to Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000) traditional strategy research has 
viewed firms as autonomous entities seeking to build resources and stake out market 
positions that lead to sustainable competitive advantage. An understanding of the 
consequences of the ubiquitous growth of strategic networks emphasizes that firms are 
more properly viewed as connected to each other in multiple networks of resource and 
other flows.51 These linkages bind them in complex relationships that are simultaneously 
competitive and cooperative. As several papers in this volume highlight, the rents that 
accrue to a firms are  partly the result of the firm’s own unique resource endowments, but 
are also in part derived from the structure of the network to which the firm belongs 
 Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000) also show how the overall network structure of 
an industry can be analyzed by considering such elements as its density, or the extent to 
which the industry is more or less constrained in its exchange relations with other 
upstream or downstream industries, and that these measures can be an important 
complement to traditional models that have focused on concentration or other measures 
of market power. 
 Supporting Gulati and al’s argument Varian (2001) states that: 
 “If the value of a network depends on its size, then interconnection and/or 
standardization becomes an important strategic decision. However standards are 
not always anathema to dominant firms. In some cases, the standard can be so 
compelling that it is worth adopting even from a purely private, profit-maximizing 
perspective.” 
 
 From a different perspective, Leyshon (2001) presents the electronic markets as 
having the potential to fundamentally reconfigure the competitive basis of the industry 
and the contestability of markets. “Thus, not only do electronic markets have the 
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potential to break down established market hierarchies through disintermediation, but 
established firms may well be disadvantaged as markets are reintermediated through 
electronic channels”. Therefore, “established firms tend to have significant sunk costs 
within physical infrastructures, and it is for this reason that electronic markets offer 
significant competitive opportunities for new or marginal competitors within existing 
industries” such as the artist.52  
 Premkumar (2003) says that “a factor that will influence the restructuring of the 
industry is the power dynamic among artists, record companies, retailers, and 
customers”.53 Also, he mentions that given the power structure in the industry, it is likely 
that record companies will influence the future distribution strategy by providing 
incentives or disincentives for customers to use one channel or another. He argues that 
the record company-retailer-customer strategy is the least disruptive to the supply chain, 
with the minimal risk of copyright violations. Premkumar goes on by emphasizing that 
the success of any digital distribution strategy depends on several important issues: 
copyright protection, communication infrastructure, and pricing and payment strategies. 
He assumes that record companies will delay large-scale digital distribution unless they 
are confident copyright violations risks are significantly reduced. He concludes that the 
digitization of music has created opportunities to reengineer the supply chain and 
improve its efficiency. 
 To support the previous arguments Hal R. Varian proposes a rich framework 
regarding information technology and consumer behavior, which includes monopolistic 
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production, supply and demand side of economies of scale and strategic positioning.  
According to Varian (2001) the term “New Economy” refers to: 
 “A golden, or at least gilded, age in the late 1990s that was driven by optimism 
about the financial prospects for in-formation technology (IT). There were three 
back-to-back investment shocks during this period: telecommunications 
deregulation in 1996, the “year 2K”problem in 1998-99, and the “dot com” boom 
in 1999-2000. These events stimulated significant investment in information 
technology in a number of industries, leading to a very rapid expansion of IT-
producing industries.”54 
 
 Varian explains that information technology allows for “fine grained observation 
and analysis of consumer behavior”55 which allows for various kinds of marketing 
strategies that were previously extremely difficult to carry out, at least on a large scale. A 
seller may offer prices and goods that are “differentiated by individual behavior and/or 
characteristics”. 
 In addition, Varian supports the idea that many information and technology-
related businesses such as the oligopoly in the music industry have a cost structure with 
large fixed costs and small, or even zero, marginal costs. 56   
Varian goes on to say that: 
“(…) if the biggest firm has the most significant cost advantages, firms will 
compete intensively to be biggest, and consumers will benefit from that 
competition. Amazon believed, rightly or wrongly, that scale economies were 
very important in online retailing, and consumers benefitted from the low prices it 
charged while it was trying to build market share. Second, it is often possible to 
overcome cost advantages when the market is growing rapidly. Even though the 
largest firm may have a cost advantage at any point in time, if the market is 
growing at 40 percent per year, the tables can be turned very rapidly. Market 
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share alone is no guarantee of success. Third, information technology has also 
reduced the minimum efficient scale of operation in many markets.”  
 
 In summary, according to Varian, although supply side economies of scale may 
lead to more concentrated industries, this may not be as bad for consumers as is often 
thought. He also supports the argument that price discipline asserts itself through “four 
different routes”, which are57: 
 
1. Competition to acquire monopoly forcing lower prices for consumers. 
2. Competition with the installed base of a firm’s own output, especially when 
technological progress is so rapid as to exceed the ability to utilize technology to 
its fullest. 
3. Pressure from complementors providing complementary products to lower prices, 
and have various ways to exert pressure to accomplish this. This sort of 
“completition” can be a very powerful force. 
4. Inventing around, even when intellectual property rights create apparently strong 
barriers to entry; competitive firms will attempt to invent around a patent, often 
creating new products. 
 
 Varian’s perspective on the traditional view of monopoly is that it creates 
deadweight loss and producer surplus, as shown in Figure 2. However, perfect price 
discrimination eliminates the deadweight loss and competition because the monopoly 
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transfers the resulting monopolistic rents to consumers.58 Varian indicates that intense 
price competition would induce online merchants to look for ways to increase customer 
loyalty. Presumably they would also try to adopt pricing strategies that would reduce the 
intensity of competition. 
 
 
Figure 2. Competition for perfectly price discriminating monopolist.59 
 
 In parallel with the classic supply side economies of scale discussed previously, 
Varian also presents “demand side economies of scale”. According to him, with supply 
side economies, average cost decreases with scale, while with demand side economies of 
scale, average revenue (demand) increases with scale. 
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2.3 Technology shock 
 The music industry was one of the first of the cultural industries to develop mass 
production using new technologies, and it has continued to be in the forefront of 
technological change.60 Successive technologies determine the way music is created, 
produced and delivered to consumers and technological change profoundly affects the 
economic organization of the industry.  Firms in the music recording industry, as well as 
firms in other culture-based industries such as motion pictures, have traditionally 
preferred technological stability, but have ultimately benefitted from technological 
change.  
As Alexander (2002) explains, “radio was ‘threatened’ by television, television by 
motion pictures, motion pictures by videocassette players, music recording by tape 
technology and so on”. In each of these examples, predictions of the imminent demise of 
the industry as a result of a new technology were wrong. In most instances, the new 
technologies displayed strong complementarities within the existing structure. 
 Hal R. Varian (1999) says that: 
 “E-commerce will undoubtedly change the way business is done. But (…) 
technology changes, economic laws do not. Despite the changes introduced by e-
commerce, many of the fundamental principles of competition will still be 
relevant.”61 
 
Challenging Varian’s statement; Silver (1999) exposes his concern when he 
explains that what is more worrisome to the music industry is not the advent of MP3 or 
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copyright issues but the emergence of a new Internet distribution channel, dictated by 
consumers: 
 “The threat to the music industry is not MP3s, but the arrival of a consumer 
distribution channel that is not controlled by the music industry” (Jeremy Silver, 
vice president of New Media, EMI).62  
 
 The music industry is in a transitional stage. “Emerging technologies have left 
old business models in disarray” (Goodrich & Rossiter, 2007).  The convergence of 
technologies has allowed independent ("indie") artists to produce their own high quality 
records leading in recording companies and performers to adapt to new models in order 
to survive.  Theodore Levitt (1983) says that: “A powerful force drives the world towards 
a converging commonality, and that force is technology”63.  
 The advantages of MP3 are particularly significant because of advances in 
broadband technologies and reduction in storage costs. Increasing availability of 
broadband access and reducing costs of portable storage devices allow downloading and 
storing of songs in MP3 in economically attractive formats. Because MP3 is operable 
across many technology platforms and has no security or copyright features, MP3 is 
immensely popular. 
Lam and Tan (2001) argue that as bandwidth increases and better compression techniques 
become available, the Internet will be a major channel of music distribution in digital 
form.64 They add that this development has important ramifications for the music 
industry, which will have to reexamine its value propositions in the light of new business 
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opportunities. Record companies have a significant influence on the demand chain as 
well as the supply chain, but in recent years, a significant market share of unaccounted 
music sales has shifted to P2P music sites.65 
Alexander (2002)66 assumes that the sustainability of a P2P sharing system is 
contingent upon whether users will be willing to share their resources with others, at a 
cost to themselves. In fact, each peer who acts as a host yields some bandwidth and 
computing resources to the client, i.e., incurs some cost. Will users be willing to yield 
some of their scarce resources to support the peer-to-peer network? 
Standard public goods theory predicts that all agents will free ride, or, as Mancur 
Olson (1965) states, “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests”67. However, there now exists a significant body of theory and 
experimental evidence relating to public goods games and experiments, much of which 
appears to contradict the predictions of standard theory. Of course, while it is plausible 
that some experiments fail to capture important elements of “real” economic interactions, 
the substantial diversity and variety of settings and experiments would appear to militate 
against a systematic bias in the results (Ostrom, 2000)68. 
Cunningham, Alexander, and Adilov (2001)69 explore peer-to-peer file sharing 
and construct a non-linear dynamical optimization model consistent with observed facts 
regarding the Napster Music Community. The model they present is in the spirit of 
                                                
65 Premkumar, G.P. (2003) Alternate Distribution Strategies for Digital Music, Communication of the 
ACM, Vol.46, No.9. 
66 Alexander, P J. (2002) Peer-to-peer File Sharing: The Case of the Music Recording Industry, Review of 
Industrial Organization, Vol.20, pp.151-161. 
67 Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
68 Ostrom, E. (2000) Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol.14, pp.137–158. 
69 Cunningham, B M, Alexander, P J, and Adilov, N. (2001) The Napster Music 
Community, Working paper. 
 
 
29   
Becker (1976)70, in that the aggregate population has an initially positive (but not 
necessarily large) fraction of altruists. The remaining agents may be purely self-interested 
– in fact, the equilibrium of the model relies on the assumption of self-interest. 
 Varian (1999) supports that by arguing:  
“There is a network externality when the value of a good depends on the number 
of other people who use it. Examples are goods like the telephone network, the 
fax machines network, the email network, or the Internet itself. Generally 
consumers would like to be connected to as large a network as possible. This 
implies that if there are several different providers of networks, then it is very 
advantageous to consumers if they interconnect.”71 
 
 This kind of linked system effect is common in high-technology industries.  
Often, products that are relatively useless unless they are combined into a system with 
other products: hardware is useless without software, DVD players are useless without 
content, and operating systems are useless without applications. These are all examples of 
complementarity, that is, goods whose value depends on their being used together.72 
 Varian also explains (2001) that:  
“When network effects are present, there are normally multiple equilibria. If no 
one adopts a network good, then it has no value, so no one wants it. If there are 
enough adopters, then the good becomes valuable, so more adopt it—making it 
even more valuable. Hence network effects give rise to positive feedback.” 
 
 In terms of specifics, Windrum and Birchenhall (2004)73 offer a rich framework 
regarding technology replacement. They investigate the conditions under which 
technological successions occur. Their research draws together two areas of inquiry that 
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have, by and large, previously been treated as separate subjects: competition between 
sequential technologies and network externalities. The interest in sequential technology 
competitions dates back to Schumpeter’s proposition that new technologies are the fuel of 
long-run economic growth, and increasing welfare.74 Long-run economic development, 
he argued, occurs when an economy moves from one technology base to another.  
 Windrum and Birchenhall argue that in order for a new technology to displace 
an established dominant technology, a new technology must overcome the network 
externalities enjoyed by an established (old) technology.  
 They support that research by arguing that the study of network externalities 
has tended to consider contemporaneous competitions between rival variants of the same 
technology (e.g. Arthur, 198975; Katz and Shapiro, 198676; Farrell and Saloner, 198577). 
A notable exception is David’s empirical case study of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 
1985)78. 
 Arthur (1988)79, as well as David and Greenstein (1990)80 list a range of supply 
and demand side factors that may lock-out a new technology.  In addition to pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary switching costs faced by users, scale economies in production, 
learning and competence creation costs for firms, and the marketing and advertising costs 
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of establishing a market for a new technology may be significant.  For each of these 
factors, increasing marginal returns accompanies growing market size and share. Taking 
these factors into account, the current discussion will consider the conditions under which 
supply and demand side externalities may be overcome by a later technology. 
Brian Arthur81 presents a compilation of papers analyzing the implications of 
increasing returns in the economy, and the reinforcement mechanism that strengthen 
early leading positions of competing technologies, products, and industry locations. 
Arthur’s methodology employs positive feedback as the explanatory mechanism for 
economic growth, based on a well-defined analytical model that provides a different view 
than traditional economic theory built on the hypothesis of diminishing returns (which 
allows for a predictable equilibrium of prices and market shares). The author notes that in 
some parts of the economy, the stabilizing forces assumed by negative feedbacks are not 
observable, and that positive feedbacks tend instead, to amplify the effects of relatively 
small economic swings, and lead to many possible equilibrium positions.  Random 
economic events thus enter a course that is not necessarily the best but in which they may 
become locked-in. Arthur uses this model to explain how countries and products may get 
ahead by chance and increase their lead further due to the effects of increasing returns.82  
Based on a simple model of allocation, Arthur considers competing technologies 
(generally unsponsored and embodied in physical machinery) for shares of a market of 
adopters, in a comparison between increasing, decreasing and constant returns to 
adoption. In the case of heterogeneous adopters, the model takes into account the payoffs 
                                                
81 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
82 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
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of two unsponsored technologies competing for the replacement of an obsolete 
technology, for two equal categories of agents differing in their preferences (R agents 
have a natural preference for technology A, and S agents have a preference for 
technology B). The variants of A and B available for choice change with the numbers nA 
and nB of previous adoptions. From the observer’s point of view, the sequence in which 
agents make their choices is unknown, in that R and S agents have equal likelihood of 
standing in the nth position, while the return functions are known and the demand for one 
agent is inelastic. The purpose of this model is to investigate whether fluctuations in the 
order of choices make a difference in the market share outcome under three differing base 
assumptions: constant returns, diminishing returns, and increasing returns.  
If the agents are homogeneous, they always chose the higher payoff technology in 
the constant returns situation. The outcome is predictable and flexible for the diminishing 
returns case. Under increasing returns, if one technology is chosen at the beginning of the 
process, that technology is reinforced and eventually takes over the market, if the returns 
rise at the same rate. If the returns increase at different rates, the outcome becomes 
unpredictable and inflexible (path dependent).  
Examples of the increasing-returns locking mechanism are those of numerous 
technologies that have become locked-in due to user externalities and have denied the 
development of more efficient ones.83 
An interesting observation is that the monopoly implied by increasing returns 
does not take place if there is heterogeneity in consumer preferences. In a non-linear 
increasing returns process in which agent-types are equally distributed in the queue, each 
                                                
83 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
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technology may be bid up to its upper bound, without getting a sufficient head start to 
become locked-in.  
Based on underlying increasing returns, Brian Arthur and David Lane build a 
model that explains the information contagion phenomenon by which products that are 
largely “sampled” may end up dominating the market due to early information-feedback 
advantage. If buyers are trying to reduce the uncertainty of a new purchase by obtaining 
information about the product from previous users, the informational feedback can 
reinforce market shares. Potential buyers “poll” previous purchasers’ experiences and are 
likely to learn more about products that have been tried extensively. This mechanism 
links a product’s prevalence with its likelihood of future purchase through information 
contagion. Since the “polling” is restricted to a fraction of the actual purchasers of a 
product, it can be said that the market is subject to a constriction of information.  
The model is based on an agent-oriented sampling, in which prospective buyers 
sample purchasers without knowing in advance which product each of them bought. It 
also assumes that purchasers process rationally the information they obtain from previous 
buyers, assimilating it through a Bayesian update of probability distributions on the 
relevant performance features. The purchasers eventually choose the product that 
maximizes the posterior expected probability. The model presumes a pure measurement 
error, homogeneous agents, constant risk aversion and a bounded stopping rule for 
terminating the sampling. The authors consider a full constriction model where the 
information is completely restricted and there is no private information- in this model, the 
product with the highest prior expected utility will be purchased by all buyers, and 
knowledge of how agents encode information is enough to predict the outcome of the 
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allocation process. In the opposite extreme case, where there is full public knowledge, a 
particular product will dominate the market, and the observation error sequence will 
impact the outcome. The full public knowledge theorem based on two products 
establishes that one product achieves strong market domination over the other with 
probability one, and that each product has a positive probability of dominating the 
other.84 
Risk aversion may determine the market domination of one product, as risk averse 
purchasers value how much they know about a product more than how good they believe 
it might be. They tend to gather more information on a leading product and hence buy 
that product. For products with high values of unanticipated effectiveness85 (the product 
is better than agents initially believed it to be), market domination is a result of the 
purchasers’ rationality, as their prior under-appreciation is disadvantageous to products 
that are less well represented, while leading products (that are sampled more) are 
advantaged by this situation and eventually take over the entire market.  Although the 
model mentioned above is based on constant stopping rules, analytical examples can be 
found showing market domination of an already leading product under sequential 
stopping times (agents sample until they acquire “sufficient” information). If the 
performance of a product is not fixed, but is rather dependent on each purchaser’s uses 
and skills, then the random effects model induces even more history dependence (good or 
bad news about a product tends to propagate).86 
                                                
84 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
85 Examples of high unanticipated effectiveness generally relate to new products based on recent scientific 
or technological breakthroughs. 
86 Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press. 
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 Windrum and Birchenhall (2004) 87explain that there is a need to clarify the stage 
of technology development that is being considered, and to distinguish between 
technological successions and technological substitutions regarding the factors relevant to 
the diffusion of a new technology. 
 They also formulate that innovation, is the point at which the invention is actually 
applied for the first time, whether this be in the form of a product or a process (Mensch, 
1979)88. 
 Windrum and Birchenhall argue that the first applications of a technology are 
“invariably crude and inefficient”; not only is their performance usually poor compared 
to existing “alternative technologies”, but the “fixed production costs” are likely to be 
very high.  Therefore, they explain that innovations are not automatically capable of 
diffusing. 
 They explain that:  
“Given that the underlying process of innovation –improving the quality/price 
characteristics a set of old and new technologies – continues after the 
technological shock has occurred, the best predictor of a post-shock succession 
occurred is a probability. This highlights an important difference between the 
‘innovation phase’ and ‘diffusion phase’ of the technology life cycle.  A 
technology may be able to survive in the innovation phase – even if it is initially 
inferior in many respects to the old technology – provided it shows sufficient 
‘promise’ or ‘potential’ to a key group of supporters.”89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
87 Windrum, P and Birchenhall, C. (2004) Structural change in the presence of network externalities: a co-
evolutionary model of technological successions, MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series.  
88 Mensch G. (1979) Stalemate in Technology: Innovations Overcome Depressions, Ballinger, Cambridge.   
89 Windrum, P and Birchenhall, C. (2004) Structural change in the presence of network externalities: a co-
evolutionary model of technological successions, MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series.  
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3 Industry structure 
 
3.1 Components  
 Music is the world’s universal form of communication. It affects every person 
and every culture. The broader music industry is worth over $160 billion worldwide.90 
Global recorded sales alone totaled $18.4 billion in 2008 in trade values, and on retail 
basis the global recorded music market was worth an estimated $27.8 billion.91 The 
United States alone stands for one-third of that global market (RIAA, 2009). 92 
 Kozul-Wright and Standbury, (1998)93 present 16 separate functions involved 
in the Music Business: singers, musicians, songwriters, producers, audio engineers, 
publishers, record manufacturers, promoters, and managers, disc jockeys, booking agents, 
venue operators, merchandise manufacturers, entertainment attorneys, distributors and 
retailers (Figure 3).  
 
                                                
90 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
91 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
92 The Recording Industry Association of America. (2009) Reasearch and Data, Washington, D.C. 
www.riaa.com 
93 Kozul-Wright, Z and Standbury, L. (1998) Becoming a globally competitive player: the case of the music 
industry in Jamaica, UNCTAD, No.138. 
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Figure 3. Traditional industry-level supply chain 
 
 
 
 Most of the services and products in the music industry are provided by the 
activities mentioned above. Though one often thinks of the music industry as CDs and 
concerts; three strict service activities can be categorized: creative services (performance 
of musicians, singers and audio engineers); technical services (recording, sound and 
lighting for venues and concert venue rentals); and representational services (managers, 
booking agents, publicist, lawyers and publishers). The service sector enjoys the 
advantage of freedom of movement throughout the global economy, as service providers 
are able to render services relatively freely anywhere in the world.94  
                                                
94 Levitt, T. (1983) The Globalization of Markets, Harvard Business Review. 
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 Leyshon (2001) identifies four networks with distinctive organizational and 
spatial characteristics: networks of creativity, of reproduction, of distribution, and of 
consumption. Leyshon argues that these four networks are being reshaped as a 
consequence of the impact of software formats and Internet distribution systems (Figure 
4). Furthermore, he argues that the short-term profitability of the Majors is being 
threatened but that the industry is already “beginning to restabilise around a new 
technological and regulatory regime designed to protect copyrights in music in software 
formats”.95   
   
 
Figure 4. Musical networks96 
                                                
95 Leyshon, A. (2001) Time-space (and digital) compression: software formats, musical networks, and the 
reorganization of the music industry, Environment and Planning A, Vol.33, pp.49-77. 
96 Leyshon, A. (2001) Time-space (and digital) compression: software formats, musical networks, and the 
reorganization of the music industry, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 33, pp.49-77. 
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 Cvetkovsky (2004)97 offers a proposition that essentially explores fundamental 
reorganization through technology. He suggests that the two-tiered traditional model 
‘Major-Minor-Indie’ has expanded to accommodate another approach. Therefore 
Cvetkovsky identifies three categories of “commodification” which are: 
1) The MAJOR music model -which entails EMI, UMG, Sony Music Entertainment, and 
Warner music Group 
2) The INDIE (independent labels) model 
3) The MICRO-label model or in my own terms: “the ARTIST-label model”. 
 
3.2 Dynamics  
 The production of music as a saleable product is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
The market for music began with the organized, corporate sale of sheet music in the 
nineteenth century, but it really took off in the twentieth century, with the emergence of 
and the demand for recorded music in the form of vinyl records, cassettes, CDs, etc98. 
Music is now a global business.99However, though the physical product itself may have 
changed, the distribution channels and the division of labor within the industry have 
remained relatively stable: artists create music, record labels promote and distribute it and 
the fans consume it.100 
 According to Parikh (1999), it is the ability of the major labels to control the 
supply chain for music that has prevented artists from independently distributing their 
                                                
97 Cvetkovski, T. (2004) The Political Economy of the Music Industry: Its Rise and Stall, School of 
Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland, Presented at the Austalasian 
Political Association Conference, University of Adelaide. 
98 Gillett, C. (1996) The Sound of the City: The Rise of Rock & Roll, 3rd ed., Souvenir Press, London. 
99 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, No.11, pp.1087-1103. 
100 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, No.11, pp.1087-1103. 
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own material. This explains why the labels collect approximately 85-90 per cent of the 
profits from music sales.101 However, the advent of the Internet and the exploding 
popularity of the illegal downloading of digital music are challenging the traditional 
supply chain model that relied on the physical distribution of music recordings such as 
CDs. The global piracy industry is now estimated to be worth about $4.8 billion, with 
about 4.5 million counterfeit CDs sold each year in the UK alone.102 
 Record making is economically as well as technically a complex process. Not 
only is it difficult to identify, develop and manage successful artists, the artistic value 
(and therefore the commercial value) of records depends on their consumers’ aesthetic 
preferences, which are neither stable nor predictable. Just because an artist has sold 
millions of records in the past does not mean they will in the future. The reverse is also 
the case.103 
 The emergence of Internet-based network technologies is allowing music 
industry bodies to operate in a virtual environment and deal with multiple suppliers and 
customers. However, conducting business over the Internet has introduced a new 
challenge. As product offers increase there is an increasing need for virtual navigators 
that provide ways and platforms for parties to find each other. To reach out to the digital 
consumer, music companies and artists will have to build relationships with these online 
platforms (Poel and Rutten, 2000).104 Virtual navigators, i.e. any kind of service that 
guides organizations and individuals to the information they require, will quickly replace 
                                                
101 Parikh, M. (1999) The music industry in the digital world: waves of changes, available at: 
www.ite.poly.edu/htmls/musicwave01.htm 
102 Reece, D. (2004) An industry poleaxed by power of the Net, The Independent, 31 March, p. 40. 
103 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, No.11, pp.1087-1103 
104 Poel, M and Rutten, P. (2000) Impact and perspectives of electronic commerce: the music 
industry in The Netherlands, available at; www.oecd.org/pdf/M00027000/M00027095.pdf 
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the co-ordination role of traditional intermediaries in virtual marketplaces. Results of this 
include the reduction in the number of physical intermediaries between the artist and the 
consumer, the outsourcing of activities by the major labels, and the re-organization of 
functions such as A&R and marketing to increases the flexibility to react rapidly to 
market changes and new business opportunities.105 As a means of transforming the 
supply chain for the purchasing and delivery of products and services, the Internet is 
becoming, and in some industries has already become, a dominant force (Hardaker and 
Graham, 2001).106 
 Not so long ago, the music industry was fully vertically integrated. The record 
companies took on full responsibility for attracting their customers. The industry 
developed most of its products-artist development, arrangements, producing… and it 
managed an extensive infrastructure, producing, advertising and manufacturing the 
records as well as distributing it to warehouses where retailers would be able to pick up 
inventory for their outlets. Today, the industry is beginning to look very different. Much 
of the typical recording product is outsourced to specialized studios, printing services, 
manufacturers and online retailers. The digitization of music has shaken the core 
processes of the major recording companies and initiated a situation where both old and 
new processes have to coexist until one/or many new business model(s) can be adopted. 
It was very frequent for a huge conglomerate company to buy an independent label 
creating profitability or significant market share. 
                                                
105 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G, and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, No.11, pp.1087-1103. 
106 Hardaker, G and Graham, G. (2001) Wired Marketing: Energizing Business for e-Commerce, 
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 
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 Digital music files (mostly in mp3 format) have become widespread on the 
Internet. File-sharing technologies pioneered by Napster and for a while dominated by 
Kazaa have become popular among certain online communities and a target for legal 
prosecution by record companies.107 Industry representatives largely attribute the recent 
drop in music sales to a rise in online file-sharing, which, from their point of view, 
simply reads as piracy of copyrighted material. Recent empirical studies lead to 
ambiguous results. Some studies show a negative effect of downloads on music 
sales108109, whereas others find a negligible or even slightly positive effect110111.  
 Liebowitz (2005)112 comes to the conclusion that the overall evidence supports 
the view that file-sharing has hurt music sales. However, this finding does not invalidate 
the argument held by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) that the music industry may gain from 
file-sharing, in particular because current P2P networks are not well-designed for 
sampling purposes. 
 Advocates of online file-sharing believe that file-sharing should be free and 
unrestricted. One argument goes that downloaders use the downloaded files for sampling 
in order to make more informed purchasing decisions. This view is to some extent 
                                                
107 Peitz, M and Waelbroeck, P. (2006) Why the music industry may gain from free downloading-The role 
of sampling, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.24, pp.907-913. 
108 Peitz, M and Waelbroeck. (2006) The effect of Internet piracy on CD sales- cross section evidence, 
Review of the Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol.1, pp.71-79.  
109 Zentner, A. (2004) Measuring the Effect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases, Mimeo, University 
of Chicago. 
110 Oberholzer, F and Strumpf, K. (2004) The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical 
Analyses, Mimeo, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
111 Boorstin, E. (2004) Music sales in the age of file sharing, Senior thesis, Princeton University. 
112 Liebowitz, S. (2005) Pitfalls in measuring the impact of file-sharing, CESifo Economic Studies, Vol.51, 
pp.435-473. 
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supported by survey data.113 Hence the argument continues, the music industry may 
actually benefit from file-sharing networks. 
 Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) present sampling as important in the market for 
recorded music because music is an experience good where horizontal product 
differentiation and taste heterogeneity are important. According to Peitz and Waelbroeck: 
 “Due to sampling, music labels may actually gain from P2P networks and use them to 
solve a two-sided asymmetric information problem between seller and buyer.” 
 Peitz and Waelbrock (2006) present a multi-product monopoly model in which 
products are located on a Salop circle and in which consumers regard each original as 
superior to its copy. Under this model, the property that sampling allows consumers to 
find a better match to their tastes, tends to lead to higher profits under file-sharing. They 
conclude that based on their model music labels do not necessarily suffer from 
downloading on P2P networks. Profits increase for a certain set of parameters because 
consumer can make more informed purchased decisions because of sampling and are 
willing to spend for the original although they could consume the download for free. 
 
3.3 Revenue streams and royalties114 
 About 60%-80% of music titles are considered failures that do not recover 
fixed costs. There is an inherent risk in the music business; that the profits from 
successful records help compensate for the losses from failures. There is a large fixed 
cost of about 75% that is carried by record companies versus a relatively small variable 
                                                
113 See Peitz, M and Waelbroeck, P. (2005) An economist’s guide to digital music, CESifo Economic 
Studies Vol.51, pp.359-428. 
114 For a further discussion of revenue streams regarding music, publishing, and license flows please refer 
to the Publishing paragraph 4.7.2. 
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cost of about 25% (Table 1). The pricing strategy plays an important role in the success 
of digital distribution. Packaged CDs are priced to distribute the risk across many songs. 
The price per song must be fixed at a level that will not cannibalize the sales of packaged 
CDs, but will provide sufficient returns to recover the cost of album development, as well 
as the cost of failures. 
  
Value-added Chain Pre-Recoupment Post-Recoupment 
Retail price $15.00  $15.00  
Wholesale price $10.50  $10.50  
Less: Manufacturing costs $2.00  $2.00  
Artist and producer royalties  $0.00  $2.00  
Mechanical royalties $0.70  $0.70  
Distributor charges $1.50  $1.50  
Record Companies' Gross Margin $6.30  $4.30  
 
  Table 1. Traditional value added chain up to the retail level 
 
 
 
 Premkumar (2003) investigates the cost breakdown of digital distribution and 
suggests potential opportunities to improve efficiency in the supply chain (Table 2).115 He 
also presents six digital music distribution strategies (Figure 5). He supports the argument 
that there are three participants in the digital supply chain, which are the content creators 
or artists, record companies, and retailers. He also provides the pros and cons for each 
distribution strategy for the stakeholders: customers, the retailers, the record companies, 
and the artists. 
 
                                                
115 Premkumar, G.P. (2003) Alternate Distribution Strategies for Digital Music, Communication of the 
ACM, Vol.46, No.9.  
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Table 2. Cost breakdown of digital distribution116
Finally, Vogel (2001) tells us that featured artists typically get a 10-15% royalty 
on sales117 and that the studio fee is paid to non-featured performers but that does not tell 
us what their earnings are in total, nor what individuals earn. Information periodically 
appears about superstar earnings but it is also well known from studies of performers’ 
116 Premkumar, G P.  (2003) Alternate Distribution Strategies for Digital Music, Communication of the 
ACM, Vol.46, No.9.
117 This is often only on 85% of sales revenue, however.  See Vogel (2001) pp.157-170.
46
earnings that the distribution is very uneven, with the few superstars having very high 
earnings and the ‘average’ performer earning modest or even low earnings118.
Figure 5. Six digital music distribution strategies 119
3.4 Production deals
Record companies are not particularly interested in signing new artists. They 
would rather profit from their current catalog of profitable artists. The large fixed costs 
endured by record labels drive these companies away from investing in new talent. That 
118 See Towse (2001) and Matsumoto, S. (2000) Performers in the Digital Era, pp196-209, in Towse, R. 
(ed) (2002) Copyright in the Cultural Industries, Edwrd Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, Mass, 
USA.
119 Premkumar, G P. (2003) Alternate Distribution Strategies for Digital Music, Communication of the 
ACM, Vol.46, No.9.
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is why “the production agreement is the singular most regressive and anti-artist contract 
introduced in the music industry during the last two decades”.120   
 Donnely (2004) explains that the most recent production agreement is called 
“net profits” deal. In this agreement, the artists are told that their band and the record 
company will “split everything 50/50”.121 These deals are typically the province of small 
independent labels; that seem to be growing at warp speed as the “majors” continue to 
merge themselves out of existence122.  
Donnelly (1999) explains how artists end up giving up the administrative control of their 
music publishing rights and 25%-50% of their publishing income to a company which is 
not a true music publisher; up to 50% of their merchandising income to a company that is 
not a real merchandiser and finally sign up over their recording rights for the next 14 
years in return for a retail record royalty of only 3% to 5%. In other words, the artist who 
is the engine that drives this entire process may actually wind-up receiving only a small 
percentage of the total royalty points in the deal and 0% of all the money which the 
record company handed over to the production company in order to acquire the artist's 
services. It can also be argued that the major labels are losing some, or even most, of their 
influence, however modern artists have new alternatives to signing with the major labels 
which is mostly due to advent of the Internet resulting in the empowerment of the artist, 
and consumers having more choice at less cost.123\ 
 
                                                
120 Donnelly, B. (1999) What’s the Deal with Production Deals? Billboard, Article II, July 31. 
121 Donnely, B. (2004) Net Profits Deals: The Recording Industry’s New Contract Du Jour, Entertainment 
Law Reporter, Vol.25, No.12, May 2004. 
122 Donnely, B.  (2004) Net Profits Deals: The Recording Industry’s New Contract Du Jour, Entertainment 
Law Reporter, Vol.25, No.12, May 2004. 
123 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, No.11, pp.1087-1103. 
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3.5 Monopolistic and oligopolistic production 
 The role of a product innovation business such as the record industry is to 
conceive attractive new products and services and figure out how best to bring them to 
market. 
In the late 1970s, the computer industry was dominated by powerful, vertically 
integrated companies with vast scale advantages like IBM, Burroughs, and Digital 
Equipment. But in the late 1980s, the power of that industry shifted as an army of smaller 
and highly specialized companies penetrated that market and thrived. 124 
Today, the music industry is following a similar path. On the macro-level, the 
“industrialization of music” is represented mainly by the majors, the labels (mostly 
subsidiaries of the majors) and the “indies” (independent labels). The global music 
industry is currently dominated by four major record companies whose profits have been 
eaten into by electronic piracy, as music consumers now have the capacity to copy CDs 
or download MP3s from the internet. The global music business is characterized by 
intense competition among a small group of large conglomerates whose market share 
approximates 70% and has remained relatively constant over the years. However, smaller 
firms and new entrants are affecting the dominance of the major record companies by 
successfully bypassing the significant entry barriers which have traditionally governed 
the areas of distribution and marketing by going directly to retail and end-users via the 
internet. In the music industry it has been overly common that each time an independent 
label creates profitability or significant market share, a huge conglomerate buys it. 
However, the oligopoly in the music industry appears to be narrowing. 
                                                
124 Hagel III, J and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review. 
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 Also, an oligopolistic industry such as the music industry, one in which several 
large and powerful firms dominate the market, is usually characterized by parallel 
behavior which may work against the best interests of the consumer, particularly in the 
area of pricing. 125 
 Oligopoly is a common market form. However, oligopolistic competition can 
give rise to a wide range of different outcomes where in some instances, the firms may 
employ restrictive trade practices such as collusion, market sharing and so forth, to raise 
prices and restrict production in much the same way as a monopoly. Where there is a 
formal agreement for such collusion, this is known as a cartel. The uniform pricing of the 
songs on Amazon and iTunes could almost be considered as a cartel. 
 Classical economic theory assumes that a profit-maximizing producer with 
some market power (either due to oligopoly or monopolistic competition) will set 
marginal costs equal to marginal revenue. This idea can be envisioned graphically by the 
intersection of an upward-sloping marginal cost curve and a downward-sloping marginal 
revenue curve (because the more one sells, the lower the price must be, so the less a 
producer earns per unit). In classical theory, any change in the marginal cost structure 
(how much it costs to make each additional unit) or the marginal revenue structure (how 
much people will pay for each additional unit) will be immediately reflected in a new 
price and/or quantity sold of the item. This result does not occur if a "kink" exists. 
Because of this jump, discontinuity in the marginal revenue curve, marginal costs in the 
music industry may change without necessarily changing marginal price or quantity. 
 The practical reason behind this process is the idea that in an oligopolistic or 
monopolistically competitive market, firms will not raise their prices because even a 
                                                
125 Knox, R L. (1966) Competitive Oligopolistic Pricing, Journal of Marketing, Vol.30, pp.47-51. 
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small price increase will lose many customers. This is because competitors will generally 
ignore price increases, with the hope of gaining a larger market share as a result of now 
having comparatively lower prices. However, even a large price decrease will gain only a 
few customers because such an action will begin a price war with other firms. The curve 
is therefore more price-elastic for price increases and less so for price decreases.126 
 Varian’s perspective on the traditional view of monopoly is that it creates 
deadweight loss and producer surplus. However, perfect price discrimination eliminates 
the deadweight loss and competition for the monopoly, and transfers the resulting 
monopoly rents to the consumers.127 Varian indicates that intense price competition 
would induce online merchants to look for ways to increase customer loyalty. 
Presumably they will also try to adopt pricing strategies that will reduce the intensity of 
competition. 
 Klemperer and Meyer (1989) recognize this phenomenon by noting that: 
“Firms will adapt to exogenous uncertainty by choosing supply functions helps to 
resolve the indeterminacy of equilibrium in oligopoly models. Under uncertainty, 
firms have strict preferences over the set of possible strategic variables, because 
their strategic variable (their supply function) must function well in many possible 
environments. This rules out almost all of the superabundance of Nash equilibria 
in supply functions under certainty, because the supply functions in these 
equilibria are not optimal except at a single point. In addition to determining how 
a firm's behavior will change in equilibrium with the exogenous demand shock, 
the chosen supply function also determines how the firm would respond out of 
equilibrium to a change in a rival's behavior”.128 
 
 
                                                
126Hannaford, S. (2007) Oligopoly Watch, The latest maneuvers of the new oligopolies and what they 
mean. http://www.oligopolywatch.com 
127 Varian, H.R. (2001) High-Technologies Industries and Market Structures, Prepared for Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, Jackson Hole Symposium. 
128 Klemperer, P D and Meyer, M A. (1989) Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty, 
Econometrica, Vol.57, No.6, pp.1243-1277. 
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 Finally, an example of how oligopoly controlling more than three-quarters of the 
music industry is represented in the way that radio programming is bought and sold. 
Powerful companies pay for the privilege of having Clear Channel or Viacom play their 
tunes. This used to be known as “payola” but has been more politely renamed 
“promotional payments”. In a fashion similar to the use of slotting fees in retail stores, 
this “quasi-legal” practice makes the radio oligopolies wealthy and guarantees that only 
the “Big Four” record companies can have their songs played on the air, pushing the 
listener who has become a victim to the margins of the Big Four.129  
 
3.5.1 The majors  
 As discussed previously, the global music business is characterized by intense 
competition among a small group of large conglomerates –the Majors- whose market 
share approximates 70% and has remained relatively constant over the last past 80 years. 
The oligopoly known as the Majors is at the time of this study composed of four 
companies. This is an important detail because there has been an active history of 
merging within the music industry.130 The intense merging within the music industry 
reduced the “big six” which existed -prior to 1999- Warner Music Group, EMI, Sony 
Music, Polygram N.V, MCA and BMG to the “big five” in 2004, EMI, Sony, Universal-
Vivendi, Time Warner and Bertelsman BMG131 and which were finally reduced to just 
four companies. 
                                                
129 Hannaford, S. (2007) Oligopoly Watch. Payola! 09/06/03 http://www.oligopolywatch.com 
130 For a detailed analysis of the mergers and joint ventures within the music industry please refer to chapter 
6. 
131 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, No.11, pp.1087-1103. 
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 These companies -in order of most to least powerful- are Universal Music 
Group (UMG), Sony Music Entertainment (Sony Music), Warner Music Group, and 
Electric and Music Industries Ltd (EMI). The three top companies are headquartered in 
New York City and are publicly traded (Table 3). 
 
 
 "Major" Labels in The Music Industry Sector 
 
Headquarters 
Location Revenue 
Parent 
Conglomerate 
Founding 
Date Type CEO 
Warner Music 
Group 
 
New York 
 
$3.491Billion 
 
None 
 
1929 
 
Public 
 
Edgar 
Bronfman 
Jr. 
 
 
Sony Music 
Entertainment 
 
New York 
 
$3.9 Billion 
 
Sony 
Corporation of 
America 
1987 
 
Public 
 
Rolf 
Schmidt-
Holtz 
 
Universal Music 
Group 
 
New York 
 
$6.14 Billion 
 
Vivendi 
 
1934 
 
Public 
 
Doug 
Morris 
 
Electric and 
Music  
Industries ltd. 
 
London 
 
$2.42 Billion 
 
Terra Firma 
Capital Partners 
 
1931 
 
Private 
 
Guy 
Hands 
 
 
Table 3. The Majors 
 
 
Overall, the “big four” exhibit a similar company-level supply chain (Figure 6). 
Each company -with the exception of Warner- is owned by a parent conglomerate. Also, 
each company owns a music publishing company as well as a large catalog of hundreds 
of record labels. 
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Figure 6. Company-level supply chain 
 
 
PolyGram was the name from 1972 of the major label recording company started 
by Philips as a holding company for its music interests in 1945. In 1999, it was sold to 
Seagrams and merged with MCA Music Entertainment, to form Universal Music Group. 
Universal Music Group (UMG) is the largest business group and family of record labels 
in the recording industry. It is the largest of the "big four" record companies by its 
commanding market share and its multitude of global operations. Universal Music Group 
is a wholly owned subsidiary of international French media conglomerate Vivendi whose 
headquarters are in Paris, France. However, the UMG global headquarters are located in 
New York City. Also, UMG owns a music publisher, Universal Music Publishing Group, 
which became the world's largest publisher following the acquisition of BMG Music 
Publishing in May 2007.132 
                                                
132 Universal Music Group Website. http://new.umusic.com/ 
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Sony BMG Music Entertainment was a global recorded music company, which 
was a 50–50 joint venture between the Sony Corporation of America and Bertelsmann 
AG. The venture’s successor, the again-active Sony Music Entertainment, is 100% 
owned by the Sony Corporation of America. Now the company is known as Sony Music 
Entertainment (or Sony Music) and is the second-largest global recorded music company 
of the "big four" record companies and is controlled by Sony Corporation of America. 
Sony music Entertainment also owns Sony Music publishing. 
Bertelsmann Music Group, (BMG), was a division of Bertelsmann before its 
completion of sale of the majority of its assets to Sony Corporation of America on 
October 1, 2008. It was established in 1987 to combine the music label activities of 
Bertelsmann. It consisted of the BMG Music Publishing company, the world's third 
largest music publisher and the world's largest independent music publisher, and the 50% 
share of the joint venture with Sony Music, Sony BMG Music Entertainment (Sony 
BMG).  
The joint venture with Sony was set up in August 2004. It reduced the Big Five of 
music companies to the Big Four record labels. At that time, the company had a 21.5% 
share in the global music market. Sony Music and BMG remained separate in Japan, 
although BMG Music Japan was wholly owned by Sony BMG. 
On March 27, 2006, the New York Times reported that Bertelsmann was looking 
to raise money by leveraging some of its media assets, and that executives from both 
companies were in talks about possibly altering the current venture. Bertelsmann sold its 
50% share of Sony BMG to Sony Corporation of America for a total of $1.5 billion and 
the company will be renamed Sony Music Entertainment Inc. 
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While officially withdrawing from the business of recorded music, Bertelsmann 
will continue its strong presence in the music industry with the forthcoming BMG 
branded company, BMG Rights Management, which will specialize in music rights 
management by representing artists and authors. It will be focused mainly in BMG's 
European stronghold markets. The basis of the company will be formed through BMG's 
decision to withhold selected European music catalogs from the former Sony BMG joint 
venture and the BMG Publishing business. 
Also kept separate from the acquisition by Sony Corporation of America was 
Sony BMG's wholly owned and operated BMG Japan. Sony Music Japan remained 
independent from the Sony BMG joint venture; therefore BMG and Sony labeling were 
kept separate in Japan under the venture. During Sony BMG's buyout, BMG Japan was 
instead picked up by Sony Music Entertainment Japan. It briefly continued to operate as a 
distinct entity until early 2009, when Japanese operations were shifted to the global Sony 
Music Entertainment, subsequently leading to BMG Japan's folding. 
BMG Music Publishing, which was not part of the Sony BMG merger, was a business of 
the Bertelsmann Music Group until it was sold to Universal Music Group for €1.63bn. 
Universal has folded the company into its publishing business Universal Music 
Publishing Group with Universal Music branding. The company was headquartered at 
245 Fifth Avenue, 8th Floor New York, 10016 and had operations in 36 offices in 25 
countries.133 
Warner Music Group (WMG) is the third-largest business group and family of 
record labels in the recording industry, making it one of the "big four" record companies. 
The current incarnation of the company was formed in 2004 when it was spun off by 
                                                
133 http://www.sonymusic.com 
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Time Warner, and as a result, Time Warner no longer retains any ownership. Warner 
Music Group also has a music publishing arm- Warner/Chappell Music.134 
Finally, the EMI Group (Electric & Musical Industries Ltd.) is a British music 
company. It is the fourth-largest business group and family of record labels in the 
recording industry, making it one of the "big four" record companies. EMI Group also 
has a major publishing arm- EMI Music Publishing- based in New York City. The 
company was once a constituent of the FTSE 100 Index but is now wholly owned by 
Terra Firma Capital Partners.135 
 
3.6 The acceleration of the product life cycle 
 The Product Life Cycle Theory was set forth by Vernon (1966)136. Vernon 
intended to address the apparent inadequacy of the comparative advantage framework in 
explaining trade and foreign investment, and to concentrate on the issues of timing of 
innovation, effects of economies of scale and, to a lesser extent, the role of uncertainty. 
Vernon explains the pattern of the production process by identifying the U.S. as a high 
average income, high unit labor cost location that is most favorable to the introduction of 
new products. The motivation also resides in the fact that there is a high degree of 
freedom for changing inputs, which may be necessary in the incipient stages of 
production, as well as effective communication between the producer and customers, 
suppliers and competitors. However, as the product matures, the demand increases, while 
there is also an increase in standardization, which leads to a lower need for flexibility and 
                                                
134 http://www.wmg.com 
135 http://www.emi.com 
136  Vernon, R. (1966) International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol.80, No.2, pp.190-207. 
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higher expectations of economies of scale and long-term commitments. This would, 
according to Vernon, determine the producer’s expansion of manufacturing units in other 
advanced countries. As the firm aims towards larger economies of scale, a need for low 
labor costs arises, which may direct the producer to establish facilities in low labor cost 
locations from which it would export products and product components to the US. Thus, 
at an advanced stage in the standardization of some products, the less developed countries 
may offer competitive advantages as production locations.  
There are four stages in a product life cycle, introduction, growth maturity and 
decline. Graph 1 represents the life cycle of the various music-recording formats 
dominant in the music industry. MP3s are already beyond the introduction stage into the 
growth maturity phase whereas CDs are in the decline stage. 
58
Graph 1. Logistic substitution of music recording media137
The music recording industry is approximately one hundred years old. In its 
infancy, the industry was dominated by a handful of ﬁrms who were responsible for the
production of most of the industry’s technological advancements138. Alexandre (1994) 
explains how these early innovators fought to establish dominance over the way music
would be produced and played. The earliest systems used wax cylinders on which sound 
waves were transduced and inscribed. This original industry standard was overtaken 
around 1914 by ﬂat disks, the manufacture of which was less costly per unit than wax 
cylinders. This change in standard led to increasing but still modest levels of competition 
137 Based on statistical data from the Recording Industry Association of America. Reasearch and Data.
2009, Washington, D.C. www.riaa.com
138 Alexander, P J. (1994) New Technology and Market Structure: Evidence from the Music
Recording Industry, Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol.18, pp.113–123.
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in the industry139. Long-playing (LP) record albums are 33⅓ rpm vinyl gramophone 
records (phonograph records), generally either 10 or 12 inches in diameter. They were 
first introduced in 1948, and served as a primary release format for recorded music until 
the compact disc began to significantly displace them by 1988. As of 2006, a renewed 
interest in vinyl has occurred and the demand for the medium has been on a steady 
increase yearly in niche markets. The long-playing record is an analog format. The digital 
recording of sound was only made practical by the technical advances in microprocessors 
and computing, which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 However, real competition in the industry arose in the 1950s with the advent of 
magnetic tape recording. Magnetic tape was easy to edit (unlike recording technology 
prior to the development of tape), and the recording devices themselves were relatively 
inexpensive to purchase. Moreover, the introduction of magnetic tape production 
technology coincided with the popular introduction of a genre of music generally known 
as rock-and-roll. During this period, concentration in the industry fell dramatically, and 
the number of new firms increased rapidly. Re-concentration in the industry resulted from 
numerous mergers and acquisitions, which, in part, left the network for independent 
distribution thin140. Currently, just four large multi-national firms account for 
approximately 95% of the (distributor level) sales in the music recording industry.  
The Compact Cassette, often referred to as audio cassette, cassette tape, cassette, 
or simply tape, is a magnetic tape sound recording format. Although originally designed 
for dictation, improvements in fidelity led the Compact Cassette to supplant reel-to-reel 
                                                
139 Alexander, P J. (1994) New Technology and Market Structure: Evidence from the Music 
Recording Industry, Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol.18, pp.113–123. 
140 Black, M and Greer, D. (1987) Concentration and Non-Price Competition in the Music 
Recording Industry, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.3, pp.13–37. 
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tape recording in most non-professional applications. Its uses ranged from portable audio 
to home recording to data storage for early microcomputers. Between the early 1970s and 
late 1990s, the cassette was one of the two most common formats for prerecorded music, 
first alongside the LP and later the Compact Disc. 
 Prior to digital technology, music was produced and distributed using vinyl 
disk sand magnetically encoded tape. Compact disks, introduced to consumers in the 
1980s, were the first element in the industry’s shift to digital technology. A compact disk 
player uses a sequence of 0’s and 1’s to reproduce sound waves. As a result, many 
consumers were able to use computers to play compact disks, as well as transfer songs 
from compact disks for storage and replay on their computers. Still, the files were 
generally not shared with large numbers of other users, since, as late as 1997, the transfer 
of three minutes of music required fifty megabytes of hard drive storage space and an 
enormous amount of time and bandwidth to transfer them across the internet.  
A Compact Disc (CD) is an optical disc used to store digital data. It was originally 
developed to store sound recordings exclusively, but later it also allowed the preservation 
of other types of data. Audio CDs have been commercially available since October 1982. 
In 2009, they remain the standard physical storage medium for audio. 
Standard CDs have a diameter of 120 mm and can hold up to 80 minutes of 
uncompressed audio (700 MB of data). The Mini CD has various diameters ranging from 
60 to 80 mm; they are sometimes used for CD singles or device drivers, storing up to 24 
minutes of audio. 
The technology was eventually adapted and expanded to encompass data storage 
CD-ROM, write-once audio and data storage CD-R, rewritable media CD-RW, Video 
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Compact Discs (VCD), Super Video Compact Discs (SVCD), PhotoCD, PictureCD, CD-
i, and Enhanced CD. 
 Development of the MP3 file format dramatically changed these storage and 
bandwidth requirements. MP3, created by engineers at the German company Fraunhofer 
Gesellshaft, is shorthand for Motion Picture Experts Group-Layer 3. MP3 is an audio 
compression format that generates near compact disk quality sound at approximately 1/10 
to 1/20 the size. For example, while each minute of music on a compact disk requires the 
equivalent of 10 megabytes of computer storage space, an MP3 format of the same piece 
could be stored on 1 megabyte or less. Clearly, MP3 technology has made digital file 
distribution more efficient. This increased efficiency is amplified by the fact that more 
and more computers are connecting to the internet via cable rather than modem, which 
significantly improves the speed at which files can be transferred. 
MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3, more commonly referred to as MP3, is a patented digital 
audio encoding format using a form of lossy data compression. It is a common audio 
format for consumer audio storage, as well as a de facto standard of digital audio 
compression for the transfer and playback of music on digital audio players. MP3 is an 
audio-specific format that was designed by the Moving Picture Experts Group as part of 
its MPEG-1 standard. The group was formed by several teams of engineers at Fraunhofer 
IIS in Erlangen, Germany, AT&T-Bell Labs in Murray Hill, NJ, USA, Thomson-Brandt, 
and CCETT as well as others. It was approved as an ISO/IEC standard in 1991. 
The use in MP3 of a lossy compression algorithm is designed to greatly reduce 
the amount of data required to represent the audio recording and still sound like a faithful 
reproduction of the original uncompressed audio for most listeners. An MP3 file that is 
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created using the setting of 128 kbit/s will result in a file that is about 1/11th the size of 
the CD file created from the original audio source. An MP3 file can also be constructed at 
higher or lower bit rates, with higher or lower resulting quality. The compression works 
by reducing accuracy of certain parts of sound that are deemed beyond the auditory 
resolution ability of most people. This method is commonly referred to as perceptual 
coding. It internally provides a representation of sound within a short-term 
time/frequency analysis window, by using psychoacoustic models to discard or reduce 
precision of components less audible to human hearing, and recording the remaining 
information in an efficient manner. While this has been presented as relatively similar to 
the principles used by JPEG, an image compression format, in fact this comparison is 
mistaken, as JPEG uses a built-in vision model that is very widely tuned, as is necessary 
for images, and MP3 uses a complex, precise masking model that is much more signal 
dependent, and that is used to guide a noise allocation, rather than bit allocation in order 
to accomplish the needs of the masking model within the bit rate available. 
 The transition from analog to digital production and reproduction has had a 
potentially significant effect on costs within the industry. With digital products the cost of 
reproducing and distributing perfect copies is functionally zero. Unlike the case where 
the tape player made production cheaper but did not alter the costs of distribution, digital 
technology has reduced both reproduction and distribution costs141. 
 Finally, over the past decade, digital technologies have permeated the music 
industry. Music has been encoded in digital form and stored on CDs, laser discs, and 
digital versatile discs. Such digital technologies have become popular due to their quality 
                                                
141 Alexander, P J. (2002) Peer-to-peer File Sharing: The Case of the Music Recording Industry, Review of 
Industrial Organization, Vol.20, pp.151-161. 
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and portability. In the past, bandwidth restrictions have impeded distribution of digital 
music over the Internet. However, these restrictions are disappearing due to advances in 
networking technologies. Consumers are now able to procure and play high-quality music 
in digital form directly through the Net, accelerating the development of the Net as an 
infotainment hub. 
 
3.7 Domestic versus international production 
 
3.7.1 Patterns of distribution 
The industry is, however, marked by highly uneven patterns of distribution. While 
the United States still remains the largest location of production as well as the most 
important market for musical output, this dominance has gradually eroded over the last 
twenty years. The relative amount of media output produced and consumed in the United 
States is declining, creating new windows of opportunity for developing countries, 
especially those with enhanced sound-recording productive capacity.  
Sideri (1997)142 mentions that globalization is: 
“(…) essentially a process driven by economic forces. Its immediate causes are: 
the spatial reorganisation of production, international trade and the integration of 
financial markets”. It is not therefore uniform across economic space- “the 
segmentation of the manufacturing process into multiple partial operations which 
combined with the development of cheap transportation and communication 
networks, has brought the increasing division of production into separate stages 
carried out in different locations”.  
 
 Based on Sideri’s view, Buckley and Ghauri (2004)143 conclude that “the 
strategies of multinational firms are therefore crucial to the causes and consequences of 
                                                
142 Sideri, S. (1997) Globalisation and regional integration, European Journal of Development Research, 
Vol.9, No.1, pp.38-81. 
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globalisation”.  In examining the changing location and ownership strategies of 
multinational enterprises, Buckley and Ghauri have shown that “the increasingly 
sophisticated decision making of managers of MNEs is slicing the activities of firms 
more finely and in finding optimum locations for each closely defined activity, they are 
deepening the international division of labor”.   
Brown, O’Connor, and Cohen (2000) suggest - describing the music scene in 
Manchester and Sheffield, England - that despite “strong local identification and 
networks the music industry is the most penetrated by global industry structures”. They 
explain that “local talent can emerge and create local waves; but it is quickly but it is 
quickly and easily taken up within large scale global business structures”. They support 
the idea that “local music scenes and acts can resonate powerfully with a local area, but a 
precondition is often a global exposure which has little in common with this local 
identity”144.   
Most countries seek to diversify the recorded music products that further tend 
towards globalization. This phenomenon, which can be characterized as worldwide 
communications is carried almost everywhere there exist the modern possibilities to 
lighten and enhance work, raise living standards, and to divert and entertain audiences. In 
what is more that a little bit of a paradox, the same countries that ask the world to 
recognize and respect their cultures insist on the wholesale transfer to them of modern 
goods, services, and technologies.  
                                                                                                                                            
143 Buckley, P J and Ghauri, P N. (2004) Globalisation, Economic Geography and the Strategy of 
Multinational Enterprises, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.35, No.2, pp.81-98. 
144 Brown, A, O’Connor, J. and Cohen, S. (2000) Local music policies within a global music industry: 
cultural quarters in Manchester and Sheffield, Geoforum, Vol.31, pp.437-451. 
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Western markets such as the United States and Western European Countries are 
characterized by an insatiable demand for novelty exemplified by the growing demand 
for the World Music genre. Based on the experiences of the last three decades, it is 
predicted that significant market opportunities for music from developing countries will 
not only continue to exist but will grow. However, developing countries have difficulties 
implementing an efficient production system within the music industry.  
“Music has to be positioned, promoted, marketed, critiqued as well as distributed” 
(Pratt, 2004)145. Some of these barriers have been traversed only by getting a recording 
contract directly with a European or American record company. There are suggestions 
offered by Pratt but none is immediate and the matter of copyrights is even greater in 
lower income developing countries than it is in developed countries. 
Power and Hallencreutz (2002)146 present the results of two case studies on two important 
music production centers: Stockholm (Sweden) and Kingston (Jamaica). They argue that 
in the music industry it is not purely the quality of the “creative milieux” that matters in 
obtaining commercial success, but also that success is highly dependent upon “the links 
between the local production system and the international circuits of capital, distribution, 
and effective property rights”147. 
 
 
 
                                                
145 Pratt, A. (2004) The music industry in Senegal: the potential for economic development, A report 
prepared for UNCTAD. 
146 Power, D and Hallencreutz, D. (2002) Profiting from creativity? The music industry in Stockholm, 
Sweden and Kingston, Jamaica, Environment and Planning A, Vol.34, pp.1833-1854. 
147 Power, D and Hallencreutz, D. (2002) Profiting from creativity? The music industry in Stockholm, 
Sweden and Kingston, Jamaica, Environment and Planning A, Vol.34, pp.1833-1854. 
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3.7.2 Distributed versus centralized production 
 Power and Hallencreutz (2002) note when comparing Stockholm and Kingston, 
that although Kingston’s products have a greater global commercial value to Stockholm, 
it is Stockholm’s “local production system and urban economy that make the bigger 
profit in real term”.148 The simple lesson to be learnt from these two cases seems to be 
that higher degrees of firm-level integration into the wider global music industry confer a 
major competitive advantage to a city’s, or a small nation’s, music industry and the 
proportion of profits that return or remain at the center.  Unlike Kingston, which has 
remained outside the global music industry and the effective international copyright 
regime, Stockholm’s music industry has prospered. Power and Hallencreutz suggest that 
the rapid growth and profitability of such markets and products in recent years are in 
need of economic development, and for smaller economies producing cultural-intense 
product innovation with a competitive position and rate of return in these industries 
should be “examined and supported by both the private and public sectors”149.    
 Also, different strategies are adopted by the online retailers. Lam and Tan (2001) 
explain that to facilitate the delivery of music files, online retailers can place servers at 
strategic places around the world to serve their consumer bases. For example, servers 
holding Asian songs can be placed in Asian cities where demands for such songs are 
high.150 
                                                
148 Power, D and Hallencreutz, D. (2002) Profiting from creativity? The music industry in Stockholm, 
Sweden and Kingston, Jamaica, Environment and Planning A, Vol.34, pp.1833-1854. 
149 Power, D and Hallencreutz, D. (2002) Profiting from creativity? The music industry in Stockholm, 
Sweden and Kingston, Jamaica, Environment and Planning A, Vol.34, pp.1833-1854. 
150 Lam, C K M and Tan, B C Y. (2001) The Internet is Changing the Music Industry, Communications of 
the ACM, Vol.44, No.8. 
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More discussion about centralized and decentralized distribution systems with P2P 
software are treated in section 4.1.1 on Piracy and Downloads. 
 
3.8 Understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness of the supply chain 
 
3.8.1 Definition  
 A supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of goods, information, and 
funds.151 Supply chains can be described as a series of linked suppliers and customers, 
who can be termed links, actors or players; chains are commonly portrayed as simple 
linear processes. Within a supply chain, upstream suppliers provide input; the company 
then adds value to these inputs, before passing them downstream to the next actor, which 
can be either another company or the end user (Porter, 1985)152. Handfield and Nichols 
(1998) describe the supply chain as all activities associated with the flow and 
transformation of goods from the raw material stage through to the end user, as well as 
the related information flows.153 Information and material flow both up and down the 
supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1998). The introduction of network technology like 
the Internet has the potential to transform the supply chains of many industries because of 
the abolition of the trade-off between richness (bandwidth, customization, interactivity) 
and reach of information (number of people involved in exchanging information) (Evans 
and Wurster, 1997)154. 
                                                
151 Wang, C. (2002) A General Framework of Supply Chain Contract Models, Annual Meeting 
Proceedings, Decision Sciences Institute. 
152 Porter, M. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, 
The Free Press, New York, NY. 
153 Handfield, R B. and Nichols, E L. (1998) Introduction to Supply Chain Management, Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
154 Evans, P B and Wurster, T S. (1997) Strategy and the new economics of information, Harvard 
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 According to Hardaker and Graham (2001) there are four interrelated dimensions 
involved in the design of supply chains155: 
• the structure of activities (Figure 7); 
• the choice of actors; 
• the governance mechanism; and 
• the co-ordination structure. 
 Hardaker and Graham explain that:  
“The supply chain structure is usually determined by a natural sequence of 
processes inherent in the manufacturing process (Figure). In many industries, 
activities are serially interdependent, which means that act two can only be 
performed if act one has been successfully completed (Thompson, 1967)156. 
However, rather than being created through a process of rational planning, the 
structure of a supply chain emerges over time and is influenced by factors such as 
chance, habit and communication and co-ordination constraints (Hardaker and 
Graham, 2001)157. 
 
 
Figure 7. The impact of the Internet on the structure of activities158 
                                                                                                                                            
Business Review, pp.69-82. 
155 Hardaker, G and Graham, G. (2001) Wired Marketing: Energizing Business for e-Commerce, 
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 
156 Thompson, J D. (1967)  Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, NY. 
157 Hardaker, G and Graham, G. (2001) Wired Marketing: Energizing Business for e-Commerce, 
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 
158 Graham, G, Burnes, B, Lewis, G and Langer, J. (2004) The transformation of the music industry supply 
chain: a major label perspective, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol.24, 
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3.8.2 The supply chain and the internet 
 
 With the explosion of connectivity through the introduction of universal technical 
standards for communication such as the Internet, extranets and intranets, this trade-off 
has largely been eliminated, which means everybody can communicate with everybody at 
almost zero cost, without constraints on the richness of information.159Traditionally, 
significant investment was required to establish a broad distribution system (e.g. a chain 
of stores), but, as Amazon.com has shown, this is no longer necessary. Consumers can be 
reached directly, and intermediaries are theoretically no longer required. This can lead to 
radical changes in business and supply chain structures. Thus business models that have 
been built on limited access to distribution channels could lose their competitive 
advantage. Indeed, there is a growing body of work which shows that the Internet is 
leading companies to develop co-operative and less profit-centered activities which can 
be encompassed under the broad heading of a supply chain network (Ince, 2000160; Lin et 
al., 1998161; Markus et al., 2000162). This concept builds on the networking literature and 
theory undertaken in physical marketplaces, such as the work of Harland (1996)163 and 
Gadde and Hakansson (1993)164.  
 A supply chain network is a series of processes (also called tiers, states or phases) 
owned by one or more enterprises in order to promote information-sharing through the 
                                                
159 Evans, P B and Wurster, T S. (1997) Strategy and the new economics of information, Harvard 
Business Review, pp.69-82. 
160 Ince, J F. (2000) VerticalNet is Building B-to-B communities with functionality, Upside, Vol.12 
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construction of a “virtual organisation”165. In this instance, a “virtual organisation” can be 
defined as a temporary network of companies that come together quickly to exploit fast-
changing opportunities. Examples would include global brokerage and contracting 
services, payment and banking services, and electronic connections to customers that 
support activities such as order fulfillment and customer service. As Graham et al. (2002) 
note, the network theorists appear to be much more concerned with using the Internet to 
develop sharing communities rather than profit-making organizations. They see the 
Internet as an opportunity to create communities in which sharing rather than profit-
making is the prime rationale for their existence.166 
 Graham et al. (2002) argue that the implications of the rise of the Internet and 
the emergence of more co-operative, network-based approaches to business have two 
significant implications for the music industry supply chain. The first implication is that 
the supply chain will be radically transformed, with many intermediaries disappearing 
and the power of the major record labels diminishing. The second implication is that 
rather than purchasing music, consumers may instead choose to share it between them, 
thus reducing the sales and profits of record companies and artists.167 
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4 Intellectual property rights 
 
4.1 Copyrights 
Different types of intellectual property such as literary and artistic creations, 
inventions, brand names, and so forth, are protected in different ways. Creations in the 
fields of literature and the arts, such as books, paintings, music, films as well as software, 
are generally through “copyright or so-called neighboring rights”.168 Copyrights are 
easily available. The moment someone writes a text, compose music or draws an image, 
he or she “will have copyright to the result”.169 Creative industries, such as publishing, 
music, film, software and arts, are a powerful generator of economic growth and 
employment in both the developed and developing countries. 
 
4.2 Copyrights issues 
  Towse (2003) tells us that the economic purpose of copyright as an incentive 
relies upon the need for property rights as a precondition for trade. She argues that 
information goods intangible in nature and therefore embodying intellectual property 
cannot be protected solely by contract as they are public goods and thus open to ‘third 
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party’ free rider use. Without statutory protection, there would be market failure and 
under-production of information goods and cultural products.170  
Gervais (2002) explains that: 
“Copyright is at a crossroads: it must adapt to the increasing demand for 
legitimate online access to protected works, especially music, but also materials 
used for research and distance education such as scientific books. Otherwise, 
peer-to-peer technology and other forms of online transmission and exchange may 
sound the death knell of copyright. The answer will depend in large part on how 
fast the so-called “content industries” are able to provide business models in tune 
with the demands of the various user communities. Chances are that copyright 
will survive. However, the way in which it is used and administered will have to 
change. The traditional exclusive rights to prohibit use of protected material seem 
almost impossible to apply in the Internet age. Yet, the copyright “concept” is still 
the best basis to claim financial compensation and organize markets, two essential 
tools for creators, publisher and producers”.171 
 
Although some have attempted to alleviate the concern about the MP3 movement 
by showing an increase in CD sales from 1999 to 2000; RIAA has attempted to shutdown 
as many illegal MP3 distribution Web Sites as possible with legal action.172 For example, 
the RIAA173 has undertaken the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI)174, together with 
record labels, with the objective of developing secure standards for music files so they 
can be distributed over the Net without being subjected to piracy abuse. 
Lam and Tan (2001) suggest that with the need for widely accepted industry 
standards, the piracy issue can be alleviated through secure standards, legislation, and 
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education.175 They acknowledge that one way to alleviate the piracy issue is to promote 
the use of watermarking when encoding digital music. Watermarking is a process of 
embedding concealed identification and tracking information directly into encoded digital 
music.176 
However, oligopolies sensitive to IPRs use copyright laws as a weapon to control 
mind space on the market and threaten competition, criticism, or even reportage. In the 
last 30 years, the majors have used their political allies to extend the tenure and scope of 
copyrights as what was once a means to protect the rights of author-composers and 
musicians for a limited time has now become the means for multinational companies to 
guarantee themselves effortless long-term profits. The article “The Tyranny of 
Copyrights?”177 published in the New York Times Magazines (2004) presents clearly the 
issue: 
“In 1790, copyright protection lasted for 14 years and could be renewed just once 
before the work entered the public domain. Between 1821 and 1909, the 
maximum term was increased from 28 to 53 years. Today, copyright protection 
for individuals lasts for 70 years after the death of individuals; for corporations, 
it's 90 years.”  
 
The consequence of such an aggressive takeover by the majors is ultimately the 
lack of work entering the public domain. An emerging phenomenon involved the “big 
four” to acquire the rights on anything they possibly can. 
     Media companies are now as focused on accumulating intellectual property as 
they are in originating new material since selling already produced and successful works 
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requires little overhead and less risk. An emerging situation and strategy in the digital age 
is something called a "permission culture."                                                                
 Paul A. David (2000) argues that: 
“Statutory modifications of the intellectual property regime are thus seen by many 
as essential if the new technical capabilities for electronic network distribution of 
digitized information are not to be crippled by an obsolescent institutional 
infrastructure, such as the protection of copyright that has evolved from the grants 
of monopoly privileges made to printers in the era of Guttenberg. It is both 
evident and understandable that IPR innovations generally are being directed 
towards facilitating the continued workings of markets in the age of electronic 
publishing and distribution of entertainment products (music and video); and 
towards providing incentives for more private investment in developing 
convenient means for consumers to access the contents of digital message 
streams”.178 
 
4.3 The history of copyrights 
 
The process of internationalizing copyright was fostered in 1886 by the Berne 
Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works, which has been successively 
revised and updated. The purpose is to establish minimum standards for authors in all 
signatory countries and to enable them to obtain the same national treatment. This 
encourages international trade in goods embodying copyrightable material by protecting 
authors’ rights (Table 4).179   
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Treaties name Date Initiative 
Level of 
Internationalization 
Berne Convention 1886 Victor Hugo Precursor 
IFPI 1933 Majors 
Organization based in 
London, UK 
Rome Convention 1961 IFPI 
International 
Poor Reception 
Geneva Convention 1971 IFPI International-36 Countries 
Athens Agreement 1989 IFPI International 
WIPO Treaties 1996 WIPO US Law 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 WIPO US Law 
 
Table 4. Copyrights treaties impacting the music industry 
 
 
 
The International Federation of Phonograph Producers (IFPI) was founded in 
1933 by a group of international record companies. The goals of the organization were: 
“(…) the defense in the international domain of the interests of the members by 
preserving their rights, statutory or otherwise, by the promotion of the new 
legislation to extend such rights or to create them in those countries where they do 
not already exist and generally by safeguarding the present and future welfare of 
member by means or representation as a federated body in negotiations with and 
representations to governments and other interested and representative bodies.”180 
Because of the limited governmental activity to protect the IPRs relating to music, 
the majors perceived a need to intervene in this domain in order to control the 
reproduction and performance of their audio software output, which was the main reason 
for the foundation of the IFPI. The initial desire for such copyright protection was 
prompted by two developments, namely the growth of the size of the international market 
for records and innovation by audio hardware companies.181 In 1961 the IFPI attempted 
to construct an international convention in order to protect the rights of artists and record 
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producers directly, resulting in the 1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations182  and contained 
articles protecting the recording of a musical performance, its broadcast, distribution, 
rental and duplication. 
Stephen Stewart (1983), the Director General of the IFPI (1961 to 1979), recalls: 
“In retrospect, I think that the turning point was the struggle to achieve what is 
known as the Rome Convention (1961), because it was the first time that both 
phonogram producers and performers were to be given rights on an international 
level. Record producers needed the two fundamental rights in the field of artistic 
works: a reproduction right and a performance right. The reproduction right was 
gained without too much difficulty, although that too was opposed by some 
national delegations at the diplomatic conference. Over the performance right 
there was a battle royal as it proved the most fiercely contested issue of the 
conference. The reason was the notion of a public performance of a work (other 
than a live performance) was relatively new and the importance of such 
performances-the audience of live performances is in the hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, whereas broadcasts may be heard and now seen by millions- was not 
fully appreciated. There is and never was any sound reason why such 
performances should not be paid for. The relevant article (Article 12 of the Rome 
Convention) had to be carried three times by solemn votes in a Sub-committee, 
the Main committee and eventually the Plenary of the Conference by a two-third 
majority. It was.”183 
 
In the light of the poor response to the Rome Convention, the IFPI decided to 
introduce a new copyright convention that was less rigorous in its demands of national 
legislature than the Rome Convention. The result was the Geneva Phonograms 
Convention of October 1971. This convention was more successful in gaining 
membership and by 1983 thirty-six countries had joined, representing 95 per cent of the 
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world’s record production.184 Solleveld (1983) informs us that the re-orientation of 
attention from the international to the national level led to a proliferation of IFPI national 
offices, which became particularly active in the realm of piracy eradication.185   
Towse (2003) explains that the 1996 WIPO copyright (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaties (WPPT) -known collectively as the WIPO 
Treaties- are the latest in a series of international agreements to establish minimum 
standards of protection in national copyright laws throughout the world. They are part of 
the WIPO Digital Agenda also known as WIPO Internet Treaties, which sets out a series 
of guidelines and goals for WIPO in seeking to develop practical solutions to the 
challenges raised by the impact of new technologies on IPRs. Put simply, they seek to set 
standards for protecting copyright and related rights for digital technologies.186      
In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)187 was passed into law to 
address legality issues in the music industry. The issues covered in DMCA include 
defining penalties for piracy of original music, setting the context of copyright 
infringements, and establishing rules for Web-casting technologies. 
An important aspect of international trade in intangible rights covered by IP law is 
that signatories to international conventions are bound to offer equal protection to trading 
partners who are also signatories. 188 
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Burke’s (1996) work highlights that “contrary to common perception, the 
incidence of low piracy does not appear to stem from specific-orientated audio 
convention. A priori, the best performer seems to be the Berne Convention.” Therefore 
Burke assesses that copyright conventions were not effective in reducing audio 
counterfeiting to comparatively low levels. He argues that economic development was 
found to be the main determinant of low counterfeit levels, which is “a necessary 
condition for the active recognition of property rights relating to recorded music, by the 
general public, judiciary and police. Burke concludes that “it is also consistent with a 
view that pirate audio software, being n inferior good, has a more buoyant market in less 
developed economies”.189 
The following few paragraphs illustrate how the treaties and acts discussed 
previously were utilized in legal settlements between the music industry on one side, and 
Napster and MP3.com on the other.  
In UMG Recording, Inc. et al. v. MP3.com, Inc. (United States District Court, 
Southern District of New York), United States District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff 
concluded that “defendant’s infringement of plaintiffs’ copy rights is clear” (p. 1, 00 Civ. 
472). During the case, MP3.com argued that its repository of legally purchased 
copyrighted material, which it distributed to registered users, was protected by “fair use”. 
However, Judge Rakoff concluded that the “defendant’s ‘fair use’ defense is indefensible 
and must be denied as a matter of law” (p. 9, 00 Civ. 472). 
In the Napster.com case, United States District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel refused a 
motion by Napster.com to dismiss the lawsuit against them, ruling that Napster.com was 
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not entitled to “safe harbor” status as provided in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) of 1998 (Section 512 (a)).190 
The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA were established to protect Internet 
service providers from liability and court-issued injunctions regardless of their 
knowledge, in the case that users of the service committed illegal actions. Judge Patel 
subsequently issued a preliminary injunction against Napster.com, ordering them to stop 
distributing copyrighted materials.191 
The RIAA asked the court to enjoin Napster.com because “Napster is causing 
irreparable harm to plaintiffs and the entire music industry”.192 
In their motion, the RIAA presented a study conducted by the Field Research 
Corporation that suggested that the use of Napster displaces compact disk sales. 
According to Lee Rainie, Director of the Pew Internet Project, technologies like 
Napster are “a huge threat to the music industry and a harbinger of the trouble the internet 
will pose to other entertainment forms like the movies”.193 
Finally, U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff, in establishing damages in the 
MP3.com case noted that: 
“The size and scope of defendant’s copyright infringement was very large and the 
potential for harm was similarly large. But on the other hand, plaintiffs have made 
not any attempt at this trial to prove actual damages they may have suffered. The 
court views the absence of any proof of actual damages as a mitigating factor 
favorable to the defendant”.194 
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4.4 Piracy and black markets 
 
4.4.1 Piracy and unauthorized downloading 
The IFPI makes a clear distinction between illegal sales of pirated CDs and 
downloading of music via P2P files and other means. According to IFPI (2009)195: 
“Unlawful downloading and swapping of music online is not the only cause of the 
unfulfilled potential of the digital music revolution-but it is a major one. Illegal 
music services pose unfair competition to legitimate start-ups. In some cases they 
make millions of dollars from selling online advertising and bundled software on 
the back of unauthorized content distribution”. 
IFPI (2009) points out that CD sales dropped by 34% globally in trade revenues to 
record companies between 1999 and 2008. According to IFPI this coincides with the key 
period of growth in usage of P2P. International data on piracy are used to calculate lost 
revenue to sound recording makers by obtaining the number of units sold multiplied by 
local pirate CD prices and in this way calculate that in 2002 piracy cost the industry US$ 
4.3 billion196. There is not such an estimate available that has been made for the access to 
MP3 files and downloads. According to Towse (2003): 
“There are several reasons why the latter are difficult to calculate: whereas the 
pirate CD market is highly organized and visible, downloads are difficult to 
measure and so far are only estimated from figures of use of illegal sites, such as 
KaZaa and Grokster, and from surveys; these figures, however, are ambiguous 
about the effect on the market since some users sample music and later purchase 
legal CDs and others, for example, children, would not otherwise purchase music  
they had  to pay  for. We can expect that information will eventually improve so 
that more accurate figures can be used to demonstrate the negative impact on 
sales but that requires economic calculations that have not yet been done.”197 
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Alexander (2002) says that decentralized systems that do not rely on a centralized 
server are worrisome to the majors.198 He explains that the architecture of distribution 
systems such as MP3.com and Napster.com are “structured around a series of centralized 
servers that direct electronic traffic and rout requests for files”. In the case of MP3.com, 
the servers hold and also distribute the files. On the other hand, Napster presents a list of 
sites where a file is hosted, and the choice of site is left to the client. In contrast, 
Alexandre argues that newer distribution systems, such as Gnutella -and its clones- and 
Freenet are decentralized, and do not make use of a central server.  
Thus, Alexandre supports that the type of legal remedies currently utilized by the 
firms in the music recording industry against Napster and MP3.com is much less effective 
on a cost basis against Gnutella or Freenet users: 
“Each individual computer that has the Gnutella or Freenet software installed on it 
becomes a server via a continuous series of pure peer-to-peer connections. So, for 
example, if one machine has the required software and internet connection, it can 
connect with another machine, which itself is connected to another machine, and 
so on. This decentralized one-to-one or pure peer-to-peer structure is precisely 
what makes these systems a threat to firms in the music recording industry. The 
lack of centralized servers means that there are few, if any, reasonable targets for 
litigation. Moreover, tracing the users of the Gnutella system is difficult. While 
users are only pseudo-anonymous on the system and hence can conceivably be 
traced, the general use of dynamic rather than static IP addresses means that every 
time a user logs on the system they are assigned a new address, thus rendering 
traces less useful. Perhaps more importantly, Freenet users are simply impossible 
to trace, which precludes detection and the potential for subsequent litigation”.199 
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4.4.2 Black markets 
 
 The increased customer power derived through the use of illegal P2P music sites 
was temporarily reduced by the legal actions taken by record companies to shut down 
P2P sites, but many new P2P sites have sprung up, reducing the impact of RIAA’s 
actions. The term piracy is generally used to describe the deliberate infringement of a 
copyright on a commercial scale. Compact disc piracy became a global problem in the 
1990’s because the technology of duplicating CDs developed rapidly, making CDs a 
quicker, easier, and cheaper product to duplicate than most other forms of sound 
recording. Let us keep in mind that CD sales still accounts nowadays for about 80% of 
overall prerecorded music sales. The pirates or counterfeits are shipped around the world 
through complicated distribution channels for sales, making the place of origin difficult 
to determine. The sales of these pirates not only infringe upon the rights of the artist 
involved, but also create unfair competition at every level of the industry supply chain. 
 As of 1998, pirate sales made up 33% of global music sales. 200 The industry 
estimate loses of about $5 billion every year due to piracy worldwide. This assessment is 
common in the music industry and accounts only for the physical product. 
 An estimated six out of every 10 CDs sold in Mexico are believed to be bootlegs, 
pummeling Mexico’s long-established local music industry. Sales in 2003 plunged to US 
$347 million, down 25% from 2002, recording industry employment has fallen by nearly 
half since 2000, and the government is losing more than US $100 million annually in tax 
revenue.201 
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 In Pakistan, piracy levels in cable television, music and software are over 90%, 
draining more than US $1 billion in tax revenue.202 
 
4.5 DRM 
David (2000) explains that it is obvious that in publishing industries, as in the 
recording industry, experimentation with new business models has been induced by the 
new, digital technology-based created economic conditions of negligible transmission 
and copying costs. He also supports that: 
“Typical of the transformed business strategies has been the provision of 
nominally priced or freely distributed data and applications programs, coupled 
with the offer of related (upgraded, enhanced and more up-to-date) information 
goods and services on a fee-for-service basis. New computer-based methods of 
encryption, and copy-protection, along with digital monitoring techniques (e.g., 
embedded “watermarks”) that can be deployed by the distributor to thwart 
unauthorized reproduction of digitized material, are also being deployed; in some 
instances to reinforce old business models based upon copyright protection, but 
cases as a means of implementing a two-part pricing strategy for marketing 
information goods that does not depend upon the protections of copyright 
laws”.203 
 
The majors, under the “umbrella” of the IFPI and national organizations such as 
BPI in the UK and the RIAA in the USA, responded vigorously to the digital threat by 
demanding levies on the sale of blank software. They also lobbied for a mechanism, 
known as Serial Copy Management System (SCMS), to be mandatory component in all 
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studio hardware.204 This system scrambles digital readings, generating nonsensical digital 
recordings. It therefore restricts home-taping to a traditional analogue method.205  
A major breakthrough in achieving this objective occurred in June 1989 with a 
“Memorandum of Agreement” between hardware and software producers and became 
known as the Athens Agreement.206 The agreement states that: 
“The European companies acknowledge that they accept the principal of royalties 
and will not oppose efforts by the Recording Industry to secure legislation to 
implement such royalties. The Japanese companies acknowledge that the 
Recording Industry (and particularly the Japan Phonograph Record Association) 
places extreme importance on the issue of royalties as remuneration for copying 
that is permitted to continue following the adoption of any technical standards. 
The Parties agree that the adoption of technical standards shall not be relied upon 
by the Parties as a basis for supporting or opposing royalties”.207 
 
This development evolved further on the 11th of July 1991 in the USA when the 
RIAA, the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) and the National Music Publisher 
Association (NMPA) agreed to lobby the US Congress for a levy on blank software and 
the mandatory installation of SCMS in all audio hardware equipment.208 
 According to Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) electronic commerce with digital 
content over open networks like the Internet provides opportunities as well as risks for 
content providers. So far, most content providers from the media and entertainment 
industry have not been profitable in charging consumers for their products209 nor have 
they been successful in creating technology frameworks required to, on the one hand, 
compensate content providers and on the other hand, protect against piracy. However, the 
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recent emergence of Digital Rights Management Systems (DRMS) seemed to help 
provide content providers with an instrument to fight piracy and sell their digital content. 
 The Association of American Publishers210 defines DRM as “the technologies, 
tools and processes that protect intellectual property during digital content commerce”. 
The role of a DRMS is to protect and manage intellectual property ownership as content 
travels through the value chain from the content creators to consumers and even from 
consumers to consumers (C2C). Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) identified seven core 
protection technologies for a DRMS (Table 5):  
• Encryption 
• Passwords 
• Watermarking 
• Digital signature 
• Digital fingerprinting 
• Copy detection systems 
• Payment systems 
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Table 5. Pros and cons of DRMS usage211 
 
 
 
 Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) argue that there are commonly nine different file 
format used by the music industry for downloading and streaming (download: wma, 
mpeg, wav, mp3, real audio, tek, liquid media; streaming: wma, real audio, mpeg, mp3, 
quicktime, flash). They state that for downloading wma is used the most frequently, 
whereas in streaming mp3 and real audio are the most common formats. 
 There are three types of pricing systems used for downloading and streaming 
which are pay-per-use, monthly subscription, and yearly subscription. Pay-per-use is the 
most commonly used price system, both for downloading and streaming. It is also 
common for the music industry to use pay-per-use and subscription simultaneously. 
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 According to Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) the most commonly used protection 
technologies are password, encryption and payment system. Record labels that do not use 
a payment system either finance their online offer through paid membership in their 
offline organization or they have outsourced the payment process. 
 Also the creation of a password enabled content providers to collect marketing 
information via Internet transaction, which is a key strategy. Predominantly private 
information is provided during the registration process allowing the identification of the 
consumer and the collection of valuable information to create user profiles for the 
company.  
 Regarding encryption, the main goals are the access control and the protection 
against piracy. Encryption assures the customer that only who has the corresponding right 
(key) can access the content. After the download/stream of encrypted content is over, it is 
not possible to make it accessible for third parties. The principal goal of a payment 
system is to increase revenues. 
 Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) conclude that content providers in the music 
industry that use encryption believe in the success of DRMS, while the non-encryption-
users do not. 
 Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) find that there is a relationship between the number 
of various protection technologies used to protect digital content and the level of 
satisfaction of the content providers. The authors also found that it cost the music 
industry about five times more to implement a DRMS than the implementation of a 
DRMS in the print industry.     
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 Fetcherin and Schmid (2003) also found that to attract and keep consumers, the 
music industry mainly offers: 
  
• Guarantee of quality (authenticity, no viruses, no Trojans horses). 
• Additional content (e.g., pictures, texts). 
• Customer support. 
• Education to the consumer. When buying legal digital content, the consumer has 
the certainty of helping an artist and not harming him. 
• Superior usability of the user interface (benefit is limited, peer-to-per networks 
are easy to handle as well). 
 However, some would argue that there is not much additional customer value 
offered except legality. Finally, content providers such as iTunes and Amazon have 
recently started offering DRM free downloads.212 
 
4.6 Collecting societies and publishing 
 
4.6.1 Collecting societies 
Towse (2003) explains that copyright collecting societies are: 
“Membership collectives that administer specific rights accorded to authors and 
publishers under copyright law, which they do by licensing rights to users and 
distributing the revenues to their members. They usually do this by issuing a 
blanket license for the repertoire of all the works of their members, which allows 
the user unlimited use of the whole repertoire assigned to (or licensed by) the 
collecting society for the duration of the license. Collecting societies world wide, 
form a network of cross-national agreements for licensing each others’ members’ 
works and thus form an international mutual network that vastly reduces costs of 
international copyright transactions. Collecting societies therefore pool 
                                                
212 For an in depth discussion on this topic please refer to Chapter 6.2. 
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transaction costs for rights owners that would otherwise be prohibitively 
expensive for individuals to exercise and reduce costs for licensees, who would 
otherwise have to trace and contract with a multitude of rights owners 
worldwide”. 213   
 
But though the license is across the board, revenues are distributed to individual 
members in accordance with the use made of their works on a ‘pay-per-use’ basis. The 
database of the collecting society enables it to provide the service to its members and it is 
the main reason why a collecting society is a natural monopoly. 
Collecting societies are set up in somewhat different ways in different countries.  
For example, in European countries and Japan, collecting societies are set up by a state 
grant of monopoly and rates for both the license tariffs and the administrative charge may 
be determined by the government.214 
 
4.6.2 Publishing 
Towse (2003) informs us how music was one of the first of the cultural industries 
to be afforded protection through copyright law. In the early years of the 20th century, 
music publishers and composers were granted mechanical rights in the so-called 
mechanical reproduction of music, at first by means of piano rolls and later through 
sound recording. Composers’ synchronization rights enable them to control the use of 
their music on TV and in film and video (Figure). With the spread of radio ownership, the 
public performance of music lead to copyright legislation that enabled composers and 
                                                
213 The Monopolies  and Mergers Commission  in  the UK  (now  known  as  the Competition Authority)  
has  accepted  the natural monopoly of collecting societies  for particular  rights.  In the USA, as is well 
known, ASCAP and BMI compete (see Caves, chapter 19). The German collecting society GEMA has also 
been subject to anti monopoly enquiry. For governance of collecting societies, see Kretschmer (2002). 
214 Towse, R. (2003) Assessing the Economic Impacts of Copyright Reform in the Music Industry, 
Commissioned by Industry Canada.  
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publishers to collect remuneration for the public performance of music from broadcasting 
and this right was later extended to sound recording makers.215   
Performing rights are the right to perform music in public. It is part of copyright 
law and demands payment to the music’s composer/lyricist and publisher with the 
royalties generally split 50/50 between the two. In simple terms a public performance 
means that a musician or group who is not the copyright holder is performing a piece of 
music live. Performances are considered "public" if they take place in a public place and 
the audience is outside of a normal circle of friends and family, including concerts, 
nightclubs, restaurants and so forth. Public performance also includes broadcast and cable 
television, radio, and any other transmitted performance of a live song trough any other 
media. Permission to publicly perform a song must be obtained directly from an artist or 
artist's representative. 
In the United States, broadcasters can pay for their use of music by either 
obtaining the permission/license directly from the music’s copyright owner who usually 
is the publisher or by obtaining a license from ASCAP and BMI to use all of the music in 
their repertories. ASCAP and BMI along with the much smaller SESAC are the three 
performing rights societies in the United States. Once these collecting societies receive 
payment from the broadcasters they are responsible for compensating the music authors 
and publisher (Figure 8). Nearly every professional composer, songwriter, lyricist and 
publisher is a member of a performing rights society and the income received from them 
is a major source of their income.  
                                                
215 Towse, R. (2003) Assessing the Economic Impacts of Copyright Reform in the Music Industry, 
Commissioned by Industry Canada.  
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Figure 8. Music, revenue, and licenses flows216 
 
 David (2000) argues that “quite evidently the rapid advances made during the 
past decade in electronic and optical telecommunications, and other components of 
                                                
216 http://www.emi.com 
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digital network technologies, are having some profoundly unsettling effects upon the 
industrial organization and competitive structure of conventional publishing businesses”. 
According to David, the disruptive impacts of these technical developments upon 
pre-existing business interests and established institutions are a familiar feature of the 
ways in which technological innovation, in the form of new processes and products, 
drives economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter (1913) described it as “creative destruction” 
– much to the shock of the academic economics establishment in the Vienna of his early 
career. Not surprisingly, then, some “IPR reform” initiatives have essentially been 
defensive responses to the disruption of the industrial status quo ante, seeking to protect 
existing streams of economic rent from new sources of competition; whereas other efforts 
have aimed to adapt the institutional and legal frameworks in ways that would create 
profitable applications of new technologies for competitive purposes”.217 
Keith C. Hauprich and Bob Donnelly (2000) discuss the repositioning of music 
labels and related issues from the publisher’s perspective as well as the artist attorney’s 
perspective.218 They tell us that new entrants are getting into music publishing every day 
“ranging from private-equity funds to record companies because publishing is perceived 
as being more insulated against the changing marketplace due to its diverse streams of 
revenue”.219     
A new phenomenon occuring is labels and publishers becoming “music 
companies” as opposed to two separate entities with different roles. Record labels are 
                                                
217 David, P.A. (2000) A Tragedy Of The Public Knowledge ‘Commons’? Global Science, Intellectual 
Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang, Stanford University.  
218 Hauprich is Vice President, Business & Legal Affairs for Cherry Lane Music Publishing Co. Inc. New 
York attorney Donnelly is a partner with the law firm of Lommen, Abdo, Cole, King & Stageberg P.A., 
with whom he recently merged his practice after serving as a sole practitioner specializing in music matters 
for 30 years. 
219 Hauprich, K and Donnelly, B. (2000) Digital Age Shifts, Roles of Labels, Music Publishers, 
Entertainment Law & Finance.  
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grasping at sources of revenue from their recording artists through “360-degree” or 
“multiple-rights” agreements that allow labels to share in artist touring, merchandise and 
product-endorsement revenues, and, at times, music-publishing revenues.  
For music publishers, as new channels of distribution have arisen and technology 
has allowed for the creation of less-expensive, high-quality recordings, the stranglehold 
of records labels has considerably weakened. Publishers now find themselves willing to 
develop and promote artists. Clearly this isn’t a novel concept. However, it’s cheaper to 
put an artist in a studio while the ever-expanding channels of distribution allow 
publishers to get right to music users. Given these factors, the frequency with which 
music publishers attempt to break new artists has increased. 
However, publishers earn the same amount of mechanical income if a song is sold 
as a single or if it’s sold as one track on an album. Therefore, according to Hauprich and 
Donnelly seems that music publishers are actually better off with the new digital-sales 
model, which emphasizes singles sales, because they are not forced to suffer the loss of 
those mechanical-royalty monies, which would not be paid by a record company if the 
album exceeded its 10 to 12 song “cap rate”. 
 Finally, Donnelly (2000) expresses his concern:  
“As music publishers start to diversify and perform traditional record-company 
functions, there is a danger that they could lose their favored status among the 
artist community. In fact, music publishers have traditionally been the artists’ 
greatest advocate when it comes to preventing record companies from 
encroaching into this area. As publishers start to become investors in an artist’s 
record career, I can’t help but worry that this fire-wall will start to be eroded when 
it is no longer in the best interests of the publisher to prevent cross-
collateralization.”220 
 
 
                                                
220 Hauprich, K and Donnelly, B. (2000) Digital Age Shifts, Roles of Labels, Music Publishers, 
Entertainment Law & Finance.  
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4.7 New business models for a new era 
 
When the first legitimate online retailers entered the marked, the major record 
companies where somewhat reluctant to license their music to these services. However, 
with the rapid growth of illegal file sharing, record companies realized that they had to 
offer file sharers an alternative to illegal downloading in order to limit the damage file 
sharing was causing. This led to an increasing willingness amongst the record companies 
to license content to online music services.  
The first legal service selling music online was eMusic, launched in the US in 
1998. This was followed by Wippit (UK) in 2000 and Pressplay, MusicNet and OD2 in 
2001. Many smaller, independent companies did license content to these services.  
However, these Companies failed to acquire content from the major record 
companies with many of the most popular artists and consequently did not attract massive 
appeal in the consumer market. It was only with the introduction of the iTunes Music 
Store (iTMS) in the US in 2003 that the online music market started to gain some 
momentum. Soon after, other major companies such as Yahoo, Microsoft, Napster, Real, 
and Sony launched online music services, creating a multitude of different types of music 
services available to the consumers.  
However, most of these were at first only available in the US, and only in the 
larger European countries (UK, Germany, and France) soon after. I will touch upon the 
development of the Norwegian online music market in later chapters.  
According to Norman (2005) presents the two dominant models for the online 
distribution of music:  
“The most dominant business model for online distribution of music is the single 
track download model, often referred to as the à la carte download model. This 
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model is used by market leading iTunes Music Store and other major players such 
as Microsoft’s MSN Music and Sony’s Connect service. The single track 
download is also the model that most resembles the traditional physical retail 
model, where the consumer purchases a product gaining a sense of ownership, 
similar to the experience of purchasing a CD. A second dominant business model 
is the subscription model. The most common variant of this model allows 
customers unlimited access to a large catalogue of music for a monthly fee. Users 
will then either be able to download or stream music. The nature of this model is 
significantly different to other models previously discussed as users do not claim 
ownership of any music. Subscription users are actually renting rather than 
owning music, and this business model represents a significant watershed in the 
nature of music distribution and consumer behaviour. Big players in the online 
distribution business favouring this model are Napster and Rhapsody. There are 
also several examples of companies giving the customer the option of either 
purchasing tracks out right, or subscribing to a music service”.221 
 
Other related models currently emerging are streaming audio and video services, 
and portable subscription services, which enable the consumer to rent a large catalogue of 
music and play it on portable devices. 
New players in the online music value chain are hardware manufacturers, Internet 
service providers (ISPs), content portals, and mobile operators. Hardware manufacturers 
are not new to the music industry, but they are arguably the most active in the online 
music business. ISPs and content portals are new to the music value chain, offering 
various types of music services. Finally, with wireless technology, music is now also 
distributed across mobile networks, facilitated by mobile operators.222 
Norman (2005) expresses that “in an attempt to become triple play providers 
(voice, broadband, and TV/content), ISPs increasingly offer interesting content to their 
                                                
221 Normann, H. (2005) Digital Distribution of Music: The role of networks and knowledge in the 
Norwegian recorded music industry, Faculty of social Sciences at the Oslo University, Norway, 
Globalization, Innovation and Policy. 
222 Normann, H. (2005) Digital Distribution of Music: The role of networks and knowledge in the 
Norwegian recorded music industry, Faculty of social Sciences at the Oslo University, Norway, 
Globalization, Innovation and Policy. 
 
 
96   
customers”. One example of this type of service is offered by UK based Playlouder 
MSP.223 
This leads to a general change in the business paradigms from “owning” to 
“sharing” (content) – from product to service (Kusek and Leonhard 2005). As control 
over access to music becomes more important in favor of control over ownership of 
music, the actors in the recorded music business will be forced to adapt to this change 
(Kusek and Leonhard, 2005)224. 
Entities like record labels that rely on one form of distribution and high-profit 
margins such as from CDs will have to re-think their business model or disappear. Unlike 
labels, music publishers aren’t beholden to the sale of prerecorded music and are better 
suited to handle the changing ways in which consumers choose to get their music. 
According to Varian, we will likely see more and more possibilities for 
customization of both information and physical products. Amazon was accused of 
charging different prices to different customers depending on their behavior 
(Rosencrance, 2000)225, but they claimed that this was simply market experimentation. 
However, the ease with which one can conduct marketing experiments on the Internet is 
itself notable. Varian presumes that companies will find it much easier to fine-tune 
pricing in Internet-based commerce, eliminating the so-called “menu costs” from the 
pricing decision. Brynjolfsson and Smith (1999) found that Internet retailers revise their 
                                                
223 Normann, H. (2005) Digital Distribution of Music: The role of networks and knowledge in the 
Norwegian recorded music industry, Faculty of social Sciences at the Oslo University, Norway, 
Globalization, Innovation and Policy,  
224 Kusek, D and Leonhard, G. (2005) The Future of Music, Boston: Berklee Press. 
225 Rosencrance, L. (2000) Amazon charging di erent prices on some DVDs. Comptuerworld, September 
05 2000. http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47_STO49569,00.html. 
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prices much more often than conventional retailers, and that prices are adjusted in much 
finer increments.226  
Varian explains that the theory of monopoly first-degree price discrimination is 
fairly simple: “firms will charge the highest price they can to each consumer, thereby 
capturing all the consumer surplus. However, it is clear that this is an extreme case. 
Online sellers face competition from each other and from offline sellers, so adding 
competition to this model is important”. 
Ulph and Vulkan (2000, 2001) have examined the theory of first-degree price and 
product differentiation in a competitive environment. In their model, consumers differ 
with respect to their most desired products, and firms choose where to locate in product 
space and how much to charge each consumer. They find that there are two significant 
effects: the enhanced surplus extraction effect and the intensified competition effect.227228 
Varian also says that second-degree price discrimination refers to “a situation 
where everyone faces the same menu of prices for a set of products. It is also known as 
“product line pricing,” “market segmentation,” or “versioning.” The idea is that sellers 
use their knowledge of the distribution of consumer tastes to design a product line that 
appeals to different market segments”. This form of price discrimination is, of course, 
widely used. We don’t normally think of musical tracks and CDs as being sold in product 
lines but, upon reflection, it can be seen that this is a common practice.229 
                                                
226 Brynjolfsson, E and Smith, M. (1999) Frictionless commerce? A comparison of Internet and 
conventional retailers, Management Science, Vol.46, No.4. http://ebusiness.mit.edu/erik/. 
227 Ulph, D and Vulkan, N. (2000) Electronic commerce and competitive f rst-degree price discrimination, 
Technical report, University College, London. http://www.ecn.bris.ac.uk/www/ecnv/welcome.htm. 
228 Ulph, D and Vulkan, N. (2000) Electronic commerce and competitive f rst-degree price discrimination, 
Technical report, University College, London. http://www.ecn.bris.ac.uk/www/ecnv/welcome.htm. 
229 Varian, H R. (2001) High-Technologies Industries and Market Structures, Prepared for Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, Jackson Hole Symposium. 
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According to IFPI (2009)230 music companies and their partners have introduced a 
variety of new legitimate services to supplement traditional business models and adapt to 
new forms of consumer demand. These include music access services, fully-interoperable 
download stores, and advertising-supported offerings. At the same time, music 
companies are working to develop new revenue streams, ranging from creating value in 
the music experience, be it through games or merchandizing products, to brand 
partnerships and improved broadcast and public performance rights. 
 Examples of ‘music access’ models launched in 2008 and early 2009 include 
Nokia’s Comes With Music available in the UK, Italy, Sweden, Singapore, and Australia; 
Sony Ericsson’s PlayNow service launched in Sweden as well as a service launched by 
local telecom TeliaSonera; Denmark’s TDC PLAY; Vodafone Spain’s unlimited music 
service; a music service from Finnish ISP DNA and a number of such partnerships in 
France with ISPs and mobile operators including Neuf Cegetel, Orange and SFR.231 
 Also IFPI (2009) believes that the consumer choice in the traditional à-la-carte 
sector is improving. Many services now offer their music catalogues free of digital rights 
management (DRM), allowing for interoperability between devices. Also early 2009 
marked the introduction of variable pricing in the download market. On iTunes, while 
many songs are still sold at 99 cents, some new releases cost $1.29 and many older 
catalogue songs now sell for 69 cents. Amazon and other online retailers are also offering 
tracks at different prices. 
                                                
230 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
231 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
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 Devices like the iPhone are also helping drive mobile music consumption. While 
the iPhone is still a niche device, accounting for around 2% of UK mobile users, iPhone 
users are much more likely to consume music.232 
 IFPI (2009) supports that music companies are working hard to monetize the 
rapidly growing area of social networks. In this case, a free-to-user experience business 
model predominates. Spending by advertisers has tilted towards online platforms in the 
last few years, with the Internet now accounting for 10.3% of global advertising spend or 
$49.9 billion.233  
 Increasingly, music platforms on social networks link the unlimited streaming 
discovery environment with purchase opportunities. By integrating the ‘free’ streaming 
experience with opportunities for consumers to buy and permanently own tracks, music 
companies can open up additional revenue streams. 
 Also, in 2008 music videos remained one of the top video categories online, 
evidenced by the most-watched videos on YouTube. Over half of the top 30 most-
watched videos on YouTube are licensed music videos from such as Avril Lavigne, Chris 
Brown and so forth. 
 Finally, in April 2009 Universal Music Group and Google partnered to create a 
new music video service called Vevo, a central repository for all of UMG’s visual 
content such as music videos, interviews and concert footage. YouTube will provide the 
technology behind the service, and will be the first online streaming video service to 
                                                
232 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
233 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
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syndicate the content. Negotiations to bring catalogues of other labels into the service are 
ongoing. The service is due to launch towards the end of 2009. 234   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
234 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
 
 
101   
 
 
 
 
 
5 Methodology and data 
  
5.1 Data 
 In order to introduce a statistical representation and the decline of physical sales 
as regard to digital sales and performance rights revenues; a data set of 47 countries from 
the year 2004 to 2008 is gathered (Appendix). The countries presented are the 47 most 
powerful producers and exporters of prerecorded music.  
 The trends showed in the analysis and model exposition represent the global 
recorded music sales in US $ billions, and music sales broken down by sectors and/or 
geographical areas in percentages. The different sectors are physical sales, digital sales, 
and performance rights revenues. The various geographical areas include North America 
(including the US and Canada), Europe, Asia (including Japan), and Latin America. In 
addition, two additional groupings are showing on the one hand the music sales for the 
top 20 higher performing countries and on the other hand the remaining 27 countries. 
 The IFPI data used in the present dissertation was compiled by Francesca 
Jacobson and Laura Childs for IFPI. I formatted this compilation into the table presented 
the Appendix and processed the data into fractions to represent the trends into 
percentages. 
 All of the data compiled and analyzed for growth and trends is based on trade 
value or wholesale value which refers to the record companies’ revenue, net of discounts, 
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returns and taxes. Promotional goods and non-music related products are excluded from 
the present data.  
 Reported physical sales include CD sales ordered via the Internet (e.g. Amazon). 
Figures are provided by the record companies in the respective markets to the local IFPI 
body. IFPI applies a ‘coverage factor’ to the figures to account for non-reporting 
companies, therefore representing 100% of the market.  
 Digital sales refer to sales via online, mobile channels, and via subscriptions. 
Income from ad-supported services, mono/polyphonic ringtone income and bundled 
subscriptions were included in the digital sales figures in 2008. IFPI has revised 2007 
digital sales for the major markets to include these new digital categories and in order to 
reflect true year-on-year digital growth. However, the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 have 
not been adjusted to include new digital categories. Online sales include single track and 
album downloads, music video downloads, streams, bundles and kiosk sales. Mobile 
music sales include master ringtones, single track downloads to mobile, ringback tones, 
music videos downloads to mobile, streams, mono/polyphonic ringtone income, 
embedded music on mile phones (pre-loaded), mobile bundles, greetings and dedications 
income. Subscription revenues include online, mobile and bundled subscriptions. 
 Performance rights revenues represent the monies received by record companies 
from music licensing companies for licenses granted to third parties for the use of sounds 
recordings and music videos in broadcasting (radio and TV), public performance 
(nightclubs, bars, restaurants, hotels) and certain Internet uses. 
 Performance rights revenues refer to distributions to record companies and it 
excludes non-allocated distributions and non-recurring distributions such as settlement 
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amounts. Distributions for the current year refer to monies collected by music licensing 
companies in the previous year (e.g. distributions for 2008 refer to monies collected in 
2007). Figures are provided by the respective companies to IFPI. Also figures are subject 
to rounding, which may affect overall totals and percentages. Finally, IFPI figures may 
differ from local industry groups’ reports due to different methodologies.235 
 Besides the inconsistencies of methodologies used by different local industry 
groups, the most important issue with the data is that there is no Internet sales value and 
corresponding percentages of global trade revenues. Therefore there is no break down 
between physical sales of CDs, DVDs, LPs, tapes which occur in stores or online. The 
second drawback is that many independent musicians whose sales occur online and who 
have not declared themselves as independent label orate affiliated with a record company 
which is not associated with any of the IFPI offices are not being represented in this data. 
 
5.2 Social network analysis 236 
 Social network analysis (SNA) is a methodological tool that belongs to the 
science of complexity. Mitchell Waldrop (1992) argues that complexity is: 
“(…) a subject that is still so new and wide-ranging that nobody knows quite how 
to define it, or even where its boundaries lie. But then, that is the whole point. If 
the field seems poorly defined at the moment, it is because complexity research is 
trying to grapple with questions that defy all conventional categories”.237 
 
 Social network analysis suggests new methods for coping with evolving 
technologies and the evolving complexity of a dynamic competitive landscape. In the 
                                                
 
236 All Social Network Analysis representations have been created using the SNA open source software 
ORA designed by Kathleen M. Carley Copyrights 2001-2009 Center for Computational Analysis of Social 
and Organizational Systems (CASOS), School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University. 
237 Waldrop, M M. (1992) Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, Simon & 
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social sciences, social network analysis has become a powerful methodological tool 
alongside statistics. Networks concepts have been defined, tested, and applied in research 
traditions throughout the social sciences, ranging from anthropology and sociology to 
business administration and history.238  
 Social network analysis focuses on ties among, for example, people, groups of 
people, organizations, and countries. These ties combine to form networks, which are 
then analyzed. Social network analysts assume that interpersonal ties matter, as do ties 
among organizations and countries, because they transmit behavior, attitudes, 
information, or goods.239 Therefore, social network analysis offers the methodology to 
analyze social relations as it tells us how to conceptualize social networks and how to 
analyze them. The main goal of social network analysis is detecting and interpreting 
patterns of social ties among actors. 
  The basis of social network visualization was laid by researchers who called 
themselves sociometrists. Their leader, J.L. Moreno, founded a social science called 
sociometry240, which studies interpersonal relations. Society, they argued, is not an 
aggregate of individuals and their characteristics, as statisticians assume, but a structure 
of interpersonal ties. Therefore, the individual is not the basic social unit. The social atom 
consists of an individual and his or her social, economic, or cultural ties. Social atoms are 
linked into groups, and, ultimately, society consists of interrelated groups. 
                                                
238 Nooy, W, Mrvar, A and Batagelj, V. (2005) Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, 
Cambridge University Press. 
239 Nooy, W, Mrvar, A and Batagelj, V. (2005) Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, 
Cambridge University Press. 
240 Nooy, W, Mrvar, A and Batagelj, V. (2005) Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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 Eight different SNAs are presented in the following chapter. SNA is an extension 
of graph theory. A graph is a set of vertices (also called points or nodes) and a set of lines 
where each line connects two vertices, therefore representing the structure of a network. 
 A vertex is the smallest unit in a network and represents an actor (record 
company, artist…) and is usually represented by a number. 
 A line which is a tie between two vertices in a network represents the social 
relation between those two vertices. That line may be directed or undirected. The SNAs 
presented below are all directed graphs where a directed line is also named an arc. 
 Formally, an arc is an ordered pair of vertices in which the first vertex is the 
sender and the second is the receiver (e.g. revenue flows). A network consists of a graph 
and additional information on the vertices or the lines of the graph. In the SNAs 
presented in he following chapter, the name of the nodes represent the additional 
information on the vertices. The lines of my networks have all equal value (meaning a 
value of one) and have no preferential choice regarding which node to go to first. Line 
values usually indicate the strength of a relation. Again, the lines in my SNAs have all 
equal strength of relation. 
  Next, some of the most important definitions of measures regarding the statistical 
analysis of a network are explained.  
 First of all, cohesion implies that a social network contains many ties and as more 
ties between agents yield to a tighter structure and therefore more cohesiveness. In SNA 
this notion is captured that the density measure. The density is the number of lines in a 
network, expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible number of lines. A network 
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in which all pairs of vertices are linked by two arcs, one in each direction is considered to 
be a network with maximum density or a complete network. 
 According to Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj (2005)241 network density is not very 
useful because it depends on the size of the network: 
“Density is inversely related to network size: the larger the social network, the 
lower the density because the number of possible lines increases rapidly with the 
number of vertices, whereas the number of ties which each agent can maintain is 
limited”.  
 
 They argue that it is better to look at the number of ties in which each vertex is 
involved. This is called the degree of a vertex. They explain that a higher degree of 
vertices yields a denser network, because vertices entertain more ties. Therefore, the 
average degree of all vertices can be used to measure the structural cohesiveness of a 
network. According to Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj, this is a better measure of overall 
cohesion than density because it does not depend on network size, so average degree can 
be compared between networks of different sizes. Also the in degree of a vertex is the 
number of arcs it receives and the out degree is the number of arcs it sends. 
 However, besides the useful analysis of the degree of various vertices, I believe 
that density measures are relevant in the present study because most of the networks 
presented are relatively of a comparable size.  
 Most social networks contain people or organizations that are central. Because of 
their position, they have better access to information and better opportunities to spread 
information. This is known as the ego-centered approach to centrality. Viewed from a 
socio-centered perspective, the network as a whole is more or less centralized. Centrality 
                                                
241 Nooy, W, Mrvar, A and Batagelj, V. (2005) Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek, 
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refers to the position of individual vertices within the network, whereas centralization 
characterizes an entire network.  
 Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj tell us that: 
“A network is highly centralized if there is a clear boundary between the center 
and the periphery. In a highly centralized network, information spreads easily but 
the center is indispensable for the transmission of information”. 
   
 For example, the larger the number of sources accessible to a person, the easier it 
is to obtain information. The importance of a vertex to the circulation of information is 
captured by the concept of betweenness centrality. High betweenness centrality indicates 
that a person is an important intermediary in the communication network. Information 
chains are represented by geodesics (the shortest path between two vertices) and the 
betweenness centrality (the variation in the degrees of vertices divided by the maximum 
degree variation which is possible in a network of the same size) of a vertex is simply the 
proportion of geodesics between pairs of other vertices that include the vertex. 
 The centralization of a network is higher if it contains very central vertices as well 
as very peripheral vertices. Network centralization can be computed from the centrality 
scores of the vertices within the network where more variation in centrality scores means 
a more centralized network. 
 
5.3 Scenario planning  
Chermack, Lynham, and Ruona (2001) tell us that: 
“Uncertainty has become an important factor for business leaders and planners to 
consider. In such a rapidly changing business environment, the ability to adapt 
quickly to major changes can mean the difference between a thriving business and 
bankruptcy. These changes are often external to the organization, and coping with 
them has forced managers and executives to adopt a systems view of business. 
With global complexities and changes likely to continue on the current path of 
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growth, the future of the global business environment will require an even more 
thorough ability to examine the forces of change and anticipate possible solutions 
to potential problems. A well known method for coping with future changes in 
organizations has been strategic planning”.242 
 
According to Cummings and Worley (2001), because organizations are open 
systems, they must strive to achieve the best possible fit with the external environment.243 
As Schoemaker (1995) said: “scenario planning is a disciplined method for imagining 
possible futures that companies have applied to a great range of issues”.244 
Scenario planning has proven to be an effective tool for identifying critical future 
uncertainties and investigating “blind spots” in the organizational structure. It is in large 
part an adaptation and generalization of classic methods used by military intelligence. 
According to Schoemaker (1995):  
“Scenarios are more than just the output of a complex simulation model. Instead 
they attempt to interpret such output by identifying patterns and clusters among 
the millions of possible outcomes a computer simulation might generate. They 
often include elements that were not or cannot be formally modeled, such as new 
regulations, value shifts, or innovations. Hence, scenarios go beyond objective 
analyses to include subjective interpretations”.245 
 
Scenario planning may involve aspects of complex systems thinking, specifically 
the recognition that many factors may combine in complex ways to create sometime 
surprising futures. Schoemaker  (1995) explains that scenario planning tries to 
compensate for “underprediction and overprediction of change” as regard to decision 
making. He also supports that scenario planning helps expand the range of possibilities 
                                                
242 Chermack, T J, Lynham, S A and Ruona, W E A. (2001) A Review of Scenario Planning Literature, 
Future Research Quarterly. 
243 Cummings, T G and Worley, C G. (2001) Organization Development and Change, (6th ed.) Cincinnati, 
South-Western College Publishing. 
244 Schoemaker, P JH. (1995) Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking, Sloan Management 
Review, pp.25-40. 
245 Schoemaker, P JH. (1995) Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking, Sloan Management 
Review, pp.25-40. 
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we can see, while avoiding to drift into “unbridled science fiction” by diving our 
knowledge into three distinct areas which are: 
1. elements we know we know 
2. elements we know that we don’t know  
3. elements that fit into the area of uncertainty (elements that we don’t know 
that we don’t know) 
 Systems thinking used in conjunction with scenario planning, leads to plausible 
scenario story lines because the causal relationship between factors can be demonstrated. 
In these cases when scenario planning is integrated with a systems thinking approach to 
scenario development, it is sometimes referred to as structural dynamics. 
 Schoemaker (1995) identifies ten steps for constructing scenario planning: 
1. Definition of the scope 
2. Identification of the different Stakeholders 
3. Identification of the basic trends 
4. Identification of the basic uncertainties 
5. Construction of the initial scenario theme 
6. Checking for consistency and plausibility 
7. Developing learning scenarios 
8. Identification of research needs 
9. Developing a quantitative model 
10. Evolving towards decision scenarios 
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In the present dissertation I attempt to combine social network analysis and 
scenario planning to construct a fresh representation of the flows of information and 
revenues within the supply chain for the music industry in a future where 1) the majors 
are nonexistent and 2) where black markets act as a substitute to the majors. 
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6 Model exposition and analysis
6.1 First implication: Physical distribution becomes less and less important
Graph 2. Global recorded music sales
112
Graph 3. Global music sales by sector
The figures (graph 2 & 3) above represent mostly the decline in sales from the 
majors. Most independent artists and record companies that are not affiliated with any 
IFPI offices are not part of this representation. It also seems that the decline in global 
recorded music sales is highly correlated with the decline in physical sales.
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Graph 4. Top 20 countries global music sales by sector
The patterns of distribution in various geographical regions are quite uneven. The 
top 20 figure seems to be perfectly aligned with the global music sales and the Asian 
market figures (Graph 8). It presents the top 20 countries (United States, Japan, UK, 
Germany, France, Canada, Australia, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Brazil, Russia, 
Switzerland, Belgium Austria, Mexico, Sweden, South Korea, India, and Denmark) as 
the driving force behind the global music industry (Graph 4). Also of importance is that, 
as of 2008, a third of the sales were divided between digital and performance rights. Note 
that, regarding the proportion of physical to digital sales; the North American (US and 
Canada) market is a year ahead the Top 20 figure and two years ahead of the European 
and Latin American regions. We can assume that the rest of the world will be following
the trend set by the US (Graph 6).
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Graph 5. Other 27 countries global music sales by sector
However the North American market seems to be behind regarding performance 
rights. This could be due to the fact that radio broadcasting, TV stations, and other media 
in the United States and Canada keep on recycling old tunes which belong to bundled 
catalogs owned by the majors which are not successful and motivated selling new 
releases (Graph 6). Also it is common in the United States that the media companies
(Radios stations, TV stations…) are also owned by conglomerates similarly to the music 
industry, which allows them to control media space and bundle the purchase of 
performance rights. It is rare when we can hear something new of the radio and TV series 
also seem to recycle old musical material.
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Graph 6. North American countries (US and Canada) global music sales by sector
Interestingly the other 27 countries represented in the data (Norway, South Africa, 
Poland, Finland, China, Turkey, Portugal, Thailand, Argentina, New Zealand, Taiwan, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Colombia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Venezuela, Chile, Philippines, Croatia, Ecuador, Peru, Slovakia, and 
Uruguay) are closely aligned with the European (Graph 7) and Latin American (Graph 9)
regions which are huge consumers and producers of music (Graph 5). In these two 
regions physical sales are still thriving and performance rights are quiet successful. The 
performance rights revenues can be associated with the popularity of night clubs, the 
variety of musical materials on the radio, and the large consumption and demand for local 
musical artists in the indigenous language. 
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Graph 7. European countries global music sales by sector
According to IFPI recorded music sales in physical formats continued to fall in 
2008 because of the continued impact of illegal downloading on CD sales, particularly 
affecting younger consumers purchasing habits; the shrinking shelf space for recorded 
music in physical stores leading to limited purchases locations for CD buyers; difficult 
economic conditions, with many shop closures taking place during 2008; increasing 
competition from other entertainment products; partial shift towards legal online 
purchasing, among younger consumer; worsening economic environment particularly 
impacting sales during Christmas 2008; the increasing ubiquity of music, leading to 
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digital consumption without purchase; and the continued impact of physical piracy in 
many markets.246
Graph 8. Asian countries global music sales by sector
246 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009.
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Graph 9. Latin American countries global music sales by sector
Finally, it is important to comprehend that prerecorded music physical sales and 
retail -or in-stores- sales are pretty much one and the same. Unfortunately, because the
data is failing to provide a break down between physical sales sold online and physical 
sales sold in stores, this data is not entirely accurate. The decline in physical sales proves 
that the traditional supply chain in the music industry is failing. The music industry’s 
profits are still very much rooted in the traditional supply chain’s model and the ability to 
control this supply chain is therefore quickly fading away forcing the majors into new 
strategic positioning.
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6.2 Second implication: The “majors” are pressured into a new strategic positioning 
 
 
 
Figure 9. SNA of the “big fours’” mergers history 
 
 
Measures Network 
Number of Nodes 24 
Number of Links 26 
Density 0.047 
Centrality-Betweenness  0.0181 
 
Table 6. SNA measures for the “big fours’” mergers history 
 
 
 
The social network analysis above presents the intense mergers history of the 
majors over the past 40 years (Figure 9). This is as far as I know the first representation 
of this complex phenomenon available in the literature. The SNA is not comprehensive, 
as it does not include all of the hundreds of record labels owned by each major. However, 
it is revealing as it represents each company’s unique history and merger strategy. In the 
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case of UMG which became the number one major; Vivendi’s strategy was to purchase 
three of the most powerful labels –MCA (former major), Seagram and Polygram (former 
major)- as well the BMG publishing group. Each company acquired a music publishing 
company but note how the BMG publishing company crossed over to become the number 
one publishing company “UMG publishing”. 
EMI and Warner on the other hand, had a very different experience. EMI was 
purchase by the conglomerate Terra Firma Capital Partners as of 2007 and became the 
only privately owned major whereas Warner experienced the opposite process as it was 
divested by the conglomerate Time Warner in 2004, which does not hold any ownership 
anymore. They lie in opposite side of the social network and seem to be a mirror 
representation of each other. 
Finally, Sony seemed to have had a more complicated history as its joint venture 
with BMG in 2004 resulted in Sony acquiring 100% of it ownership over BMG as of 
2008. However, Sony made a strategic mistake letting BMG publishing go to UMG. 
Sony would have probably been the number one major if not for that incident. However 
Sony and UMG seem to have a particular relationship as seen in the following SNA. 
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Figure 10. SNA of the “big fours’” technology JVs and alliances 
 
 
Measures Network 
Number of Nodes 21 
Number of Links 22 
Density 0.052 
Centrality-Betweenness  0.0026 
 
Table 7. SNA measures technology JVs and alliances 
 
 
 
The next step and second SNA prepared for this dissertation depicts the “big 
fours’” technology joint ventures and alliances with “new service companies” (Figure 
10). It shows how the majors are creating alliances with new service companies such as 
P2P service companies (Qtrax), supply chain management companies (Accenture, 
Microsoft IM Group), digital distribution companies (iTunes, Amazon.com, Tunecore), 
mobile phone companies (Verizon Wireless, Sprint, Nokia, AT&T), social networking 
sites (Myspace), and media and broadcasting companies (YouTube, AOL). 
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The key information in this SNA is the emergence of the most central node -
iTunes. As of January 2009, the software-based online digital media store operated by 
Apple Inc, accounted for 70% of worldwide online digital music sales and making the 
service the largest legal music retailer.247 The “big four” cannot do without iTunes. It has 
become a necessity and the worse fear for the majors because it owns the leading 
technology for pushing online digital music sales. Note how all of the other “new service 
companies” are peripheral and act in isolation in comparison to iTunes. This also shows 
the dominance and the quasi monopolistic position of iTunes as well as the high level of 
competition and the lack of collaboration between the other technology companies. The 
low density (0.052) and centralization (0.0026) measures support the fact that there is no 
cooperation between iTunes and the other technology companies (Table 7).   
Will iTunes become one of the new majors? That is the key question. As artists 
now have the ability to sell their songs directly on iTunes bypassing record companies it 
would not be far fetched to suggest that iTunes could replace the majors. If iTunes would 
acquire and run a major publishing company, the majors would be placed in a very 
difficult position, as they would have no reason to exist anymore. Leyshon (2001) argues 
that a secure digitally distributed future “would be seen in some quarters of the music 
industry as a highly effective measure to neutralize the power of the retailers”.248 
Another interesting emerging alliance is the collaboration between Sony and 
UMG on one end, and YouTube and Google on the other, to create an online streaming 
video service company -Vevo. Would the number one and number two majors attempt to 
                                                
247 iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US. http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03itunes.html 
248 Leyshon, A. (2001) Time-space (and digital) compression: software formats, musical networks, and the 
reorganization of the music industry, Environment and Planning A, Vol.33, pp.49-77. 
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find a safe house within Vevo to survive the dominance of iTunes in the area of the 
online digital market. 
EMI and Warner have adopted similar strategies forming alliances with similar 
companies and compete against each other. 
 In summary, EMI and Warner have opted to compete with a similar strategy 
against each other whereas UMG and Sony chose a more collaborative strategy.  
Finally, an important detail available in the SNA above is the fact that both 
Amazon.com (2007) and iTunes (2009) have recently been offering their digital products 
DRM-free. There has not been any scholarly literature on this topic as of the time of the 
writing of this dissertation. It is an area of great interest for the future of the music 
industry and is an open door for further research.    
 
6.3 Third implication and base scenario: The centrality of the supply chain revolves 
around the artist. 
 
 
Figure 11. SNA music industry supply chain (information flows) 
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Important 
Vertices Network Artist 
Record 
Companies 
Promo & 
Distribution 
Legal 
Services 
Publishing 
Companies 
Number of 
Nodes 26 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of 
Links 206 24 20 16 15 9 
Density 0.3169 NA NA NA NA NA 
Centralization 
Measures             
Total Degree 0.48 0.76 0.62 0.34 0.44 0.3 
Indegree 0.3776 0.68 0.52 0.52 0.4 0.28 
Outdegree 0.544 0.84 0.72 0.16 0.48 0.32 
Centrality-
Betweenness  0.2244 0.1654 0.264 0.1521 0.057 0.0243 
Centrality-
Closeness 0.7316 0.8621 0.7813 0.3521 0.641 0.5814 
 
Table 8. SNA measures (information flows) 
 
 
In general the music industry’s supply chain has evolved drastically in the past 25 
years from a traditional model to an online model but to be more adequate the music 
industry’s supply chain has been recently in an early stage of rebundling. It is a little bit 
more complex than purely an online value chain. As discussed previously, physical 
product sales are rapidly declining while record companies try to reposition themselves 
forming alliances with new service companies. Therefore, the supply chain for the music 
industry is somewhat in a transitional stage forming a hybrid value chain. In this hybrid 
supply chain, the positioning of every agent involved in the music industry has been 
shaken. 
Therefore, in this part of my analysis, building on the works of Leyshon (2001), 
Premkumar (2003) and Graham, Burnes, Lewis and Langer (2004), I created two distinct 
sets of social network representations of the music industry’s supply chain’s information 
flows and revenue flows. Those SNAs offer a detailed visualization of where the agents 
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involved in the music industry are positioned in the supply chain under different 
conditions. By combining scenario planning and social network analysis, I have 
simulated a total of six SNAs for the supply chain’s information flows and revenue flows 
combined. The first two SNA representations in this section are my base scenario or in 
other words the actual virtual representation of what the music industry’s supply chain 
looks like. The remaining four SNAs are an alternate virtual representation of what the 
music industry’s supply chain could become under various conditions.   
I am also offering analytical measures for the networks as a whole as well as for 
five individual nodes (artist, record companies, promotion and distribution, legal services 
and publishing companies). 
Figure 11 reveals where every agent involved in the music industry is positioned 
in today’s supply chain. The overall density of the network is quiet high (0.3169) telling 
us that the network is cohesive and that every agent is closely intertwined which is also 
explained by a very high centrality-closeness measure (0.7316) (Table 8).  
However, the key information exposed by this SNA is the artist as being the most 
central and most important agent in the supply chain. Without the artist there would not 
be a music industry. It has the larger amount of links (24) as well as a high centralization 
total degree249 measure (0.76). Therefore, the artist carries a high level of cohesiveness 
with the other agents within the supply chain.  
Record companies (20 links, 0.62 centralization total degree) and legal services 
entertainment lawyers (15 links, 0.44 centralization total degree) are also central to the 
social network and key players transmitting information throughout the supply chain. 
                                                
249 The total degree represents the average between indegree and outdegree. 
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Finally, promotion and distribution companies (16 links, 0.34 centralization total 
degree) and music publishing companies (9 links, 0.3 centralization total degree) have 
also important functions within the supply chain keeping the information flowing within 
the network and supporting the artist and the record companies. 
 
 
Figure 12. SNA music industry supply chain (revenue streams) 
 
Important 
Vertices Network Artist 
Record 
Companies 
Promo & 
Distribution 
Legal 
Services 
Publishing 
Companies 
Number of 
Nodes 26 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of 
Links 79 18 16 9 8 7 
Density 0.1215 NA NA NA NA NA 
Centralization 
Measures             
Total Degree 0.3017 0.4 0.38 0.18 0.16 0.14 
Indegree 0.248 0.32 0.2 0.36 0.32 0.16 
Outdegree 0.456 0.48 0.56 0 0 0.12 
Centrality-
Betweenness  0.1556 0.1694 0.1504 0 0 0.0379 
Centrality-
Closeness 0.2427 0.1344 0.1389 0.0385 0.0385 0.125 
 
Table 9. SNA measures (revenue streams) 
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Figure 12 represent the revenue flows in the music industry’s supply chain. This 
network is much less cohesive as shown by a low level of density (0.1215)(Table 9). 
Again, the artist is the most central vertex or agent within the supply chain (18 links, 0.4 
total degree). The indegree measure (0.32) shows the variation of vertices that provide 
revenue to the artist whereas the outdegree measure (0.48) shows the variation of 
expenses that the artist provides to the other agents within the supply chain.  
The record companies are in a similar position as the artist regarding revenue 
flows. The outdegree measure (0.56) shows us that the record companies greatly 
contribute economically to the music industry’s supply chain. In fact, the SNA tells us 
that the record companies are the biggest contributors to the supply chain. Therefore 
many agents within the supply chain depend on the record companies to survive. 
Note that the legal services (out degree 0, in degree 0.32) and promotion and 
distribution (out degree 0, and in degree 0.36) are only on the receiving end of the 
revenue flow. Therefore they do not contribute financially to the other agents within the 
supply chain. 
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6.4 Scenario 1: “What if” record companies disappeared? 
 
 
 
Figure 13. SNA music industry supply chain (information flows (-) record 
companies) 
 
 
Important 
Vertices Network Artist 
Promo & 
Distribution 
Legal 
Services 
Publishing 
Companies 
Number of Nodes 25 1 1 1 1 
Number of Links 176 23 15 14 8 
Density 0.933 NA NA NA NA 
Centralization 
Measures           
Total Degree 0.519 0.7708 0.3333 0.4167 0.2708 
In degree 0.3889 0.6667 0.5 0.375 0.25 
Out degree 0.6059 0.875 0.1667 0.4583 0.2917 
Centrality-
Betweenness  0.1966 0.2127 0.0328 0.0533 0.0256 
Centrality-
Closeness 0.9414 0.8889 0.0524 0.6316 0.5714 
 
Table 10. SNA measures (information flows (-) record companies) 
 
 
The first figure (Figure 13) in my first alternate scenario shows a supply chain 
where record companies are inexistent. In the occurrence of such an event the supply 
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chain would become much less cohesive as shown by an extremely low-density measure 
(0.933) (Table 10). Visually this is obvious as the network becomes more stretched out 
exhibiting more outliers such as the synchronization or the talent agencies/agencies 
vertices. 
The positioning of the artist is virtually unchanged. In fact, as record companies 
disappear the artist would be constraint to get more involved, take charge and “self-
manage”. This is partly shown by increased measures of total degree (0.77) and 
outdegree (0.875) as well as a slight increase in centrality-closeness measure (0.89). 
Lawyers would also have increased responsibility as some of the tasks formerly 
performed by the record companies would be delegated to them. This is represented 
similarly to artist by an increase in total degree measure (0.4167), outdegree (0.45) and 
centrality-closeness (0.63). 
However, the promotion and distribution companies and music publishing 
companies as well as most of the other agents within the supply chain would be impacted 
negatively as the flow of information/tasks would slow down as in a stage of recession. 
This is shown by lower measures across the board. 
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Figure 14. SNA music industry supply chain (revenue streams (-) record companies) 
 
 
 
Important Vertices Network Artist 
Promo & 
Distribution 
Legal 
Services 
Publishing 
Companies 
Number of Nodes 25 1 1 1 1 
Number of Links 64 20 8 7 7 
Density 0.1067 NA NA NA NA 
Centralization 
Measures           
Total Degree 0.4049 0.4792 0.1667 0.1458 0.1458 
In degree 0.2361 0.2917 0.3333 0.2917 0.1667 
Out degree 0.5833 0.6667 0 0 0.125 
Centrality-
Betweenness  0.279 0.2868 0 0 0.0731 
Centrality-
Closeness 0.2605 0.1412 0.04 0.04 0.1304 
 
Table 11. SNA measures (revenue streams (-) record companies) 
 
 
The first alternate scenario’s revenue flow network (Figure 14) is also impacted 
by a lower level of cohesiveness (density 0.1067 as compared to 0.1215 in the base 
model) (Table 11). Surprisingly, all of the agents -including the artist and lawyers- within 
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the revenue flow supply chain are worse off in this scenario. This information is provided 
by the lower values in the indegree measures for all the agents and the network as a 
whole. 
Therefore, I would argue that the majors are the driving force behind the 
economical welfare of the music industry’s supply chain. If the majors would disappear, 
which is a likely possibility, the present social network analysis predicts that it would 
financially impact the whole supply chain including the artist.      
 
6.5 Scenario 2: “What if” piracy and black markets became a substitute for the 
record companies? 
 
 
 
Figure 15. SNA music industry supply chain (information flows (-) record 
companies (+) piracy & black markets) 
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Important 
Vertices Network Artist 
Promo & 
Distribution 
Legal 
Services 
Publishing 
Companies 
Number of Nodes 26 1 1 1 1 
Number of Links 188 24 16 13 8 
Density 0.2892 NA NA NA NA 
Centralization 
Measures           
Total Degree 0.4883 0.74 0.34 0.4 0.26 
In degree 0.3648 0.64 0.52 0.36 0.24 
Out degree 0.5728 0.84 0.16 0.44 0.28 
Centrality-
Betweenness  0.2334 0.2775 0.0304 0.1226 0.0258 
Centrality-
Closeness 0.7608 0.8621 0.2632 0.625 0.5682 
 
Table 12. SNA measures (information flows (-) record companies (+) piracy & black 
markets) 
 
 
The purpose the my second alternate scenario (Figure 15) is to test out what 
would be the impact of piracy and black markets on the music industry’s supply chain in 
a utopia world where record companies are inexistent. It has been previously discusses in 
this dissertation that record companies occur significant losses due to piracy and black 
markets. This second scenario builds upon my previous model to pay particular attention 
to the welfare of the artist. 
The results are quiet surprising as the overall network is much denser than in the 
previous scenario (0.2892) (Table 12). However, it is slightly less dense than my base 
scenario (0.3169). Our most central agent is again the artist. The artist is here impacted 
by piracy as regard to the inflow of information (indegree 0.64). However, the outdgree 
and the centrality-closeness measures are not impacted hardly at all. This can be 
explained by the fact that black markets and piracy also rely on the artist’s creative work 
in order to make a profit. 
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Also interesting, lawyers are slightly impacted (total degree 0.4, centrality 
closeness 0.625) by the advance of piracy and black markets because the latter does not 
require legal services. Similarly, music publishing companies (total degree 0.26) are 
further negatively impacted as piracy and black markets, marginal by definition, do not 
require their services. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. SNA music industry supply chain (revenue streams (-) record companies 
(+) piracy & black markets) 
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Important 
Vertices Network Artist 
Promo & 
Distribution 
Legal 
Services 
Publishing 
Companies 
Number of Nodes 26 1 1 1 1 
Number of Links 65 16 9 7 7 
Density 0.1 NA NA NA NA 
Centralization 
Measures           
Total Degree 0.2817 0.36 0.18 0.14 0.14 
In degree 0.2704 0.24 0.36 0.28 0.16 
Out degree 0.3952 0.48 0 0 0.12 
Centrality-
Betweenness  0.2265 0.2374 0 0 0.0578 
Centrality-
Closeness 0.1937 0.0899 0.0385 0.0385 0.0868 
 
Table 13. SNA measures (revenue streams (-) record companies (+) piracy & black 
markets) 
 
 
In this last figure (Figure 16), the impact of piracy and black markets on the 
revenue flows within the music industry’s supply chain is quiet clear. The density of this 
network is the lowest of the three (0.1) (Table 13). In this scenario the artist suffers a 
great deal shown by lower scores in total degree (0.36 as compared to 0.4 in the base 
scenario and 0.48 in the first alternate scenario) and in centrality-closeness (0.089 as 
compared to 0.134 in the base scenario and 0.141 for the first alternate scenario). 
Therefore, the artist economical welfare greatly suffers from piracy and black markets. 
Let’s mention that P2P file sharing could to some extent be affiliated to the category of 
the piracy and black market agent. 
Legal services and music publishing companies are also slightly negatively 
affected by the piracy and black market but to a much lesser degree than the artist. 
Finally, I would like to add that as seen in the layout of this SNA; it is obvious that if a 
vertex representing the record companies were to be added, it would obviously suffer 
similar losses to the artist.     
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7 Conclusion 
 
Music is the world’s universal form of communication and it affects every person 
and every culture. The broader music industry is worth over $160 billion worldwide. I 
assessed that carrying research about the music industry was undoubtedly legitimate. 
Therefore, this thesis offers an analysis of the international music industry supply chain- 
a supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of goods, information, and funds. 
My dissertation addresses the following three research questions: 
Given the revolution in technology in the music industry where do the Majors fit? 
What is the positioning of the artist in the new digital technology? And given the change 
of position of the Majors and the positioning of the artist what are the descriptive and 
prescriptive possibilities should the Majors disappear and be replaced by alternate 
elements in the music industry supply chain? 
 I argue that the advent of the Internet and peer-to-peer (P2P) software programs 
for exchanging music via the Internet is having a significant impact on both the supply 
chain for music and the dominance of the big record labels also known as the Majors. 
The physical product, such as a CD, is being replaced by a digital product, which can be 
distributed via the Internet. As no one knows at this stage where this revolution in 
technology is going to lead the long established music industry; three major implications 
for the music industry can be observed. The first implication is that the physical 
distribution chain will become less and less important. The second is that the “big four” 
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stranglehold on the music industry is likely to lessen as 1) other players find it easier to 
enter the market and 2) the rise of music piracy create a shift in revenue streams forcing 
the record labels into new directions and strategic positioning. The third implication 
views the positioning of the agent responsible for the value-added quality within the 
music supply chain, namely the artist, which is a key point of this dissertation.  
 I build my academic framework upon two sets of literature. The first set views in 
detail the industry structure whereas the second set focuses on the copyrights literature 
relevant to the music industry. 
I build upon Hagel and Singer’s (1999)250 concept describing fractured industries 
not just as unbundling, but also rebundling, creating a new organization. Then, I build my 
theoretical argument upon technology shock and technology replacement as regard to the 
MP3 replacing the CD and explain that in order for a new technology to displace an 
established dominant technology, a new technology must overcome the network 
externalities enjoyed by an established (old) technology (Windrum and Birchenhall). 251 
I follow by describing how the music industry is characterized by intense 
competition among a small group of large conglomerates whose market share 
approximates 70% and has remained relatively constant over the years-the majors. 
However, smaller firms and new entrants are in the making of affecting the dominance of 
the major record companies by successfully bypassing the significant entry barriers in the 
areas of distribution and marketing by going directly to retail and end-users via the 
Internet. 
                                                
250 Hagel III, J. and Singer, M. (1999) Unbundling the Corporation, Harvard Business Review. 
251 Windrum, P and Birchenhall, C. (2004) Structural change in the presence of network externalities: a co-
evolutionary model of technological successions,  MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series. 
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 The industry is, however, marked by highly uneven patterns of distribution. 
While the United States still remains the largest location of production as well as the 
most important market for musical output, this dominance has gradually eroded over the 
last twenty years.  On top of that record companies are not particularly interested in 
signing new artists. They would rather profit from their current catalog of profitable 
artists. The large fixed costs endured by record labels drive these companies away from 
investing in new talents.  
 Therefore, the majors are now as focused on accumulating intellectual property 
as they are in originating new material since selling already produced and successful 
works requires little overhead and less risk. The consequence of such an aggressive 
takeover by the majors is ultimately the lack of work entering the public domain. An 
emerging phenomenon involved the “big four” to acquire the rights on anything they 
possibly can. 
 Another issue is labels and publishers becoming “music companies” as 
opposed to two separate entities with different roles. Record labels are grasping at 
sources of revenue from their recording artists through “360-degree” or “multiple-rights” 
agreements that allow labels to share in artist touring, merchandise and product-
endorsement revenues, and music-publishing revenues.  
 
7.1 Contribution and limitations 
 
 In order to address my three research questions, first, I introduce a statistical 
representation and the decline of physical sales as regard to digital sales and performance 
rights revenues. 
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 It presents the top 20 countries (United States, Japan, UK, Germany, France, 
Canada, Australia, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Brazil, Russia, Switzerland, Belgium 
Austria, Mexico, Sweden, South Korea, India, and Denmark) as the driving force behind 
the global music industry. Also of importance is that, as of 2008, a third of the sales were 
divided between digital and performance rights. Note that, regarding the proportion of 
physical to digital sales; the North American (US and Canada) market is a year ahead the 
Top 20 figure and two years ahead of the European and Latin American regions. 
Also of interest are the other 27 countries represented in the data (Norway, South 
Africa, Poland, Finland, China, Turkey, Portugal, Thailand, Argentina, New Zealand, 
Taiwan, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Colombia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Venezuela, Chile, Philippines, Croatia, Ecuador, Peru,  Slovakia, and 
Uruguay)  are closely aligned with the European and Latin American regions 
 Finally, I suggest that it is important to comprehend that prerecorded music 
physical sales and retail -or in-stores- sales are pretty much one and the same. 
Unfortunately, because the data is failing to provide a break down between physical sales 
sold online and physical sales sold in stores, this data is not entirely accurate. The decline 
in physical sales proves that the traditional supply chain in the music industry is failing. 
The music industry’s profits are still very much rooted in the traditional supply chain’s 
model and the ability to control this supply chain is therefore quickly fading away forcing 
the majors into new strategic positioning. 
 To describe where the majors fit into a new strategic positioning, I combine 
social network analysis and scenario planning. Building on the works of Leyshon (2001), 
Premkumar (2003) and Graham, Burnes, Lewis and Langer (2004), I construct a fresh 
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representation of the flows of information and revenues within the supply chain for the 
music industry. Social network analysis focuses on ties among, people, groups of people, 
organizations, and countries whereas scenario planning is a disciplined method for 
imagining possible futures to a great range of issues. 
I further explain how in general the music industry’s supply chain has evolved 
drastically in the past 25 years from a traditional model to an online model. To be more 
adequate the music industry’s supply chain has been recently in an early stage of 
rebundling. It is a little bit more complex than purely an online value chain. As discussed 
previously, physical product sales are rapidly declining while record companies try to 
reposition themselves forming alliances with new service companies. Therefore, the 
supply chain for the music industry is somewhat in a transitional stage forming a hybrid 
value chain. In this hybrid supply chain, the positioning of every agent involved in the 
music industry has been shaken. Therefore, I create visual representations of the new 
positioning of those agents.  
My first social network analysis presents the intense mergers history of the majors 
over the past 40 years. This is as far as I know the first representation of this complex 
phenomenon available in the literature. The SNA is not comprehensive, as it does not 
include all of the hundreds of record labels owned by each major. However, it is 
revealing as it represents each company’s unique history and merger strategy. 
My second SNA shows how the majors are creating alliances with new service 
companies such as P2P service companies (Qtrax), supply chain management companies 
(Accenture, Microsoft IM Group), digital distribution companies (iTunes, Amazon.com, 
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Tunecore), mobile phone companies (Verizon Wireless, Sprint, Nokia, AT&T), social 
networking sites (Myspace), and media and broadcasting companies (YouTube, AOL). 
The key information in this SNA is the emergence of the most central node -iTunes. 
I argue that as artists now have the ability to sell their songs directly on iTunes 
bypassing record companies it would not be far fetched to suggest that iTunes could 
replace the majors. Also, if iTunes would acquire and run a major publishing company, 
the majors would be placed in a very difficult position, as they would have no reason to 
exist anymore. 
My SNA also indicates that EMI and Warner have opted to compete with a 
similar strategy against each other whereas UMG and Sony have chosen a collaborative 
strategy. 
In my second sets of SNA, I expose that the artist is being the most central and 
most important agent in the supply chain. Without the artist there would not be a music 
industry. My analysis also tells us that the record companies are the biggest contributors 
to the supply chain. Therefore many agents within the supply chain depend on the record 
companies to survive. 
 The first figure in my first alternate scenario shows a supply chain where record 
companies are inexistent. I support that in the occurrence of such an event the supply 
chain would become much less cohesive. However, I show that the positioning of the 
artist is virtually unchanged. In fact, as record companies disappear the artist would be 
constraint to get more involved, take charge and “self-manage”. Lawyers would also have 
increased responsibility as some of the tasks formerly performed by the record companies 
would be delegated to them. However, the promotion and distribution companies and 
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music publishing companies as well as most of the other agents within the supply chain 
would be impacted negatively as the flow of information/tasks would slow down as in a 
stage of economic recession. 
Therefore, I argue that the majors are the driving force behind the economical 
welfare of the music industry’s supply chain. If the majors would disappear, which is a 
likely possibility, the present social network analysis predicts that it would financially 
impact the whole supply chain including the artist.      
The purpose of my second alternate scenario is to test out what would be the 
impact of piracy and black markets on the music industry’s supply chain in a utopia 
world where record companies are inexistent. It has been previously discusses in this 
dissertation that record companies occur significant losses due to piracy and black 
markets. This second scenario builds upon my previous model to pay particular attention 
to the welfare of the artist. The artist is here impacted by piracy as regard to the inflow of 
information but the outflow of information and the closeness of the artist as regard to the 
other agents within the supply chain, is hardly unchanged. This can be explained by the 
fact that there would be no reason for black markets and piracy to exist if not for the 
artist’s creative work. Therefore, I conclude that the artist economical welfare greatly 
suffers from piracy and black markets. 
 
7.2 Further considerations 
 
An important detail available in my SNA on joint ventures and alliances is the 
fact that both Amazon.com (2007) and iTunes (2009) have recently been offering their 
digital products DRM-free. To my knowledge, there has not been any scholarly literature 
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on this topic as of the time of the writing of this dissertation. It is an area of great interest 
for the future of the music industry and open lot of opportunities for further research.    
Also what is abundantly clear is that further research is needed on the long-term 
trends of sales of sound carriers. Though claims are being made that the value of falling 
sales is the appropriate measure of piracy and illegal downloading on the Internet, my 
analysis does not accept this simplistic analysis of the effects of piracy. I recognize that 
there is considerable damage done by these illegal behaviors but not that falling sales 
measure the cost of piracy. Towse (2003) argues that: 
“It is necessary that property rights are properly established and defended by law 
but that cannot be maintained indefinitely in the face of popular resistance. The 
dynamic problem is to persuade a generation of young free-riders that it is in 
every-one’s long term interests for property rights to be respected.” 252 
 
I believe that further research is also needed on digital supply of music and the 
returns from it to sound recording makers and to performers. 
Finally, the international aspect of the changes to the Copyright Act is crucial, 
given the emphasis in the WIPO Treaties on international trade. To quote Acheson and 
Maule (1999):  “Lack of conformity in copyright laws and their enforcement, together 
with increasing trade in copyrighted material, has led to a series of trade irritants between 
countries.” (p. 258).253  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
252 Towse, R. (2003) Assessing the Economic Impacts of Copyright Reform in the Music Industry, 
Commissioned by Industry Canada.  
253 Acheson, K  and Maule, C.  (1999) Much Ado About Culture: North American Trade Disputes,  
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
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Appendix 1: Table presenting music sales for 47 countries from 2004 to 2008 
 
 
  PHYSICAL (US$ Millions) DIGITAL 
COUNTRIES 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Canada 630.2 598.8 527.3 424.0 359.1 2.1 16.6 32.2 53.0 77.0 
USA 7002.7 6376.0 5542.0 4559.1 3138.7 211.5 636.0 1094.2 1530.9 1783.3 
Austria 169.4 158.2 144.9 140.8 123.6 1.6 5.0 8.4 9.6 10.2 
Belgium 203.9 186.7 179.2 169.5 146.2 1.1 3.6 11.4 13.4 19.8 
Croatia 13.8 12.3 12.5 14.4 12.5        
Czech Republic 44.5 34.7 31.3 29.5 34.1    1.2 2.0 2.1 
Denmark 135.5 128.6 122.7 111.4 90.4   1.8 7.8 13.4 19.4 
Finland 98.9 95.6 89.4 82.6 80.7    2.2 3.7 4.4 
France 1473.6 1435.5 1241.9 1004.0 803.8 20.0 33.0 83.4 102.4 160.3 
Germany 1690.4 1668.6 1578.4 1494.5 1416.0 17.6 46.1 81.8 111.8 123.4 
Greece 81.9 76.6 70.9 65.7 46.9    4.6 5.7 5.6 
Hungary 45.5 38.6 40.1 36.4 25.5    0.6 1.2 1.2 
Italy 501.4 485.7 422.7 341.7 268.5 4.3 18.4 27.9 28.2 28.9 
Netherlands 336.8 283.9 264.2 243.9 207.9 1.3 5.8 9.7 12.4 15.1 
Norway 171.9 149.7 131.2 122.6 103.1   2.0 5.0 8.1 10.8 
Poland 92.9 85.9 85.1 95.5 102.9    0.4 2.7 4.4 
Portugal 104.7 95.4 83.6 71.2 61.8    3.7 3.8 4.4 
Russia 352.3 220.2 228.8 222.1 209.2    0.8 3.5 7.6 
Slovakia   10.2 8.4 7.3 6.6        
Spain 454.8 429.1 364.6 270.9 237.4 2.4 4.9 20.0 27.0 29.1 
Sweden 184.4 164.4 148.3 130.5 119.9 0.2 3.5 9.1 10.2 10.8 
Switzerland 246.9 234.9 204.0 186.2 172.9   3.5 7.0 11.8 13.2 
Turkey 116.5 107.7 96.2 84.8 73.7    0.5 2.1 3.6 
UK 2248.8 2131.8 1931.5 1614.6 1458.8 18.2 69.2 120.2 159.4 252.2 
China 104.8 68.0 54.0 41.2 31.5    30.7 34.7 50.5 
Hong Kong 67.1 66.1 56.5 49.8 42.4    4.6 6.5 7.2 
India 112.7 112.3 107.3 97.4 89.6    10.2 21.8 29.0 
Indonesia 59.3 50.3 40.5 32.3 24.3    26.4 22.5 28.9 
Japan 3813.5 3665.4 3565.5 3348.3 3215.6 122.5 295.6 439.4 654.5 820.8 
Malaysia 29.0 26.2 22.9 18.5 14.7    4.9 4.8 6.2 
Philippines 22.8 23.6 19.3 15.2 13.4    0.8 1.1 2.3 
Singapore 44.7 38.6 29.7 26.1 20.5    1.1 1.0 1.4 
South Korea 89.4 71.9 58.4 47.5 56.4    74.0 73.7 84.3 
Taiwan 137.3 101.7 67.0 62.1 49.6    4.8 8.1 8.1 
Thailand 116.2 93.3 59.5 48.1 43.0    14.5 14.9 25.0 
Australia 531.7 455.6 423.4 369.7 325.2 1.3 8.2 23.8 33.0 51.2 
New Zealand 78.3 76.9 65.4 57.4 51.6    3.0 4.3 5.2 
Argentina 36.7 47.0 53.1 56.4 54.7    1.1 2.1 2.7 
Brazil 399.8 348.3 257.1 176.9 179.0   2.2 6.0 16.6 29.7 
Chile 27.0 25.8 22.3 20.5 12.7    1.0 2.8 4.1 
Colombia 29.8 31.5 30.1 22.0 21.0    1.5 4.1 6.3 
Ecuador 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.0 1.6        
Mexico 232.6 255.8 222.0 171.0 129.7   0.5 8.3 15.5 15.7 
Peru 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.6        
Uruguay 2.5 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.0        
Venezuela 9.4 10.6 12.8 15.6 18.2     0.8 1.0 
South Africa 110.6 121.5 124.0 126.2 114.6   0.5 2.0 2.8 3.4 
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  PERFORMANCE RIGHTS RECORDED MUSIC SALES (US$ Millions) 
COUNTRIES 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Canada 18.1 19.5 20.1 632.3 616.5 577.7 496.4 456.3 
USA 15.3 23.5 54.8 7214.2 7011.9 6651.5 6113.5 4976.8 
Austria 12.2 13.1 13.5 170.9 163.2 165.5 163.5 147.3 
Belgium 12.0 18.9 26.1 205.0 190.3 202.6 201.8 192.1 
Croatia 3.1    13.8 12.3 15.6 14.4 12.5 
Czech 
Republic 4.5 5.2 5.6 44.5 34.7 37.0 36.6 41.8 
Denmark 15.0 12.8 14.7 135.5 130.5 145.6 137.5 124.5 
Finland 10.4 9.9 10.7 98.9 95.6 102.1 96.1 95.9 
France 76.1 77.7 85.5 1493.6 1468.6 1401.4 1184.0 1049.6 
Germany 89.1 92.1 88.3 1708.0 1714.7 1749.3 1698.4 1627.8 
Greece 2.6 4.3 5.5 81.9 76.6 78.1 75.7 58.0 
Hungary 5.3 6.2 6.5 45.5 38.6 46.1 43.8 33.2 
Italy 21.8 22.8 28.6 505.8 504.1 472.4 392.7 326.1 
Netherlands 33.8 45.5 48.9 338.1 289.8 307.7 301.9 271.9 
Norway 7.5 9.6 10.2 171.9 151.8 143.6 140.3 124.0 
Poland 2.0 3.7 4.8 92.9 85.9 87.6 101.9 112.2 
Portugal 2.4 2.6 2.6 104.7 95.4 89.6 77.6 68.8 
Russia 0.3 0.7 4.0 352.3 220.2 229.9 226.2 220.8 
Slovakia 1.7 2.6 3.2   10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8 
Spain 25.0 30.2 36.0 457.2 434.0 409.6 328.1 302.4 
Sweden 12.4 13.2 12.5 184.7 168.0 169.8 153.9 143.2 
Switzerland 0.9 5.5 6.3 246.9 238.4 211.8 203.5 192.5 
Turkey 1.8 2.8 3.6 116.5 107.7 98.5 89.7 80.9 
UK 112.9 118.8 134.4 2267.0 2201.0 2164.6 1892.8 1845.4 
China      104.8 68.0 84.7 75.9 82.0 
Hong Kong 5.4 6.3 6.2 67.1 66.1 66.4 62.7 55.8 
India 12.4 12.8 21.8 112.7 112.3 117.5 132.1 140.4 
Indonesia      59.3 50.3 67.0 54.8 53.2 
Japan 69.4 70.2 72.7 3936.1 3961.0 4074.3 4072.9 4109.0 
Malaysia 3.8 3.9 4.4 29.0 26.2 31.6 27.2 25.3 
Philippines      22.8 23.6 20.1 16.2 15.8 
Singapore 2.4 0.6 1.4 44.7 38.6 33.2 27.7 23.3 
South Korea      89.4 71.9 132.4 121.2 140.6 
Taiwan    1.3 137.3 101.7 71.8 70.2 59.1 
Thailand   0.6 0.3 116.2 93.3 74.1 63.6 68.3 
 PHYSICAL (US$ Millions) DIGITAL 
REGIONS 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
North America 7632.9 6974.8 6069.3 4983.1 3497.8 213.6 652.6 1126.4 1583.9 1860.3 
Europe 8768.8 8234.3 7479.9 6540.1 5802.4 66.7 196.8 405.7 532.4 726.5 
Asia 4596.8 4317.4 4080.6 3786.5 3601.0 122.5 295.6 611.4 843.6 1063.7 
Latin America 743.6 727.1 604.9 469.4 421.5 0.0 2.7 17.9 41.9 59.5 
Asia excl. Japan 783.3 652.0 515.1 438.2 385.4 0.0 0.0 172.0 189.1 242.9 
Top 20 20810.8 19411.7 17534.2 15124.0 12747.9 404.1 1153.9 2075.6 2902.1 3581.0 
Others 1651.9 1495.9 1313.3 1208.4 1066.2 0.0 2.5 114.6 139.8 188.8 
GLOBAL 
(47Countries) 22462.7 20907.6 18847.5 16332.4 13814.1 404.1 1156.4 2190.2 3041.9 3769.8 
 
 
155   
  PERFORMANCE RIGHTS RECORDED MUSIC SALES (US$ Millions) 
COUNTRIES  
(continued) 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Australia 10.9 11.3 12.8 532.9 463.8 458.0 413.9 389.2 
New Zealand 1.5 1.9 2.3 78.3 76.9 69.9 63.6 59.1 
Argentina 3.7 4.7 5.9 36.7 47.0 57.9 63.3 63.2 
Brazil 10.9 11.6 13.1 399.8 350.5 274.0 205.2 221.8 
Chile 1.6 1.5 1.7 27.0 25.8 24.9 24.8 18.5 
Colombia 1.8 2.0 2.1 29.8 31.5 33.5 28.1 29.5 
Ecuador    0.1 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.0 1.6 
Mexico 0.1 0.6 0.5 232.7 256.3 230.4 187.1 145.9 
Peru 0.2 0.2 0.4 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.0 
Uruguay 0.3 0.5 0.6 2.5 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.6 
Venezuela 0.4 0.7 1.1 9.4 10.6 13.3 17.0 20.3 
South Africa    1.7 110.6 122.0 126.0 128.9 119.7 
REGIONS             
North 
America 33.4 43.0 74.9 7846.5 7628.4 7229.2 6609.9 5433.1 
Europe 452.8 498.2 551.5 8835.6 8431.6 8338.5 7570.3 7080.7 
Asia 93.4 94.4 108.1 4719.4 4613.0 4773.1 4724.5 4772.8 
Latin America 19.0 21.8 25.5 743.7 729.8 642.1 533.2 506.4 
Asia excl. 
Japan 24.0 24.2 35.4 783.3 652.0 698.8 651.6 663.8 
Top 20 548.6 600.8 694.6 21215.1 20567.0 20146.0 18626.6 17023.6 
Others 62.4 69.8 82.2 1651.9 1498.5 1490.8 1417.7 1337.4 
GLOBAL 
(47Countries) 611.0 670.6 776.8 22867.0 22065.5 21636.8 20044.3 18361.0 
 
Data Source: IFPI Recording Industry in Numbers 2009 254 
                                                
254 IFPI (2009) Recording Industry in Numbers 2009: The Definitive Source of Global Music Market 
Information, Published by IFPI, May 2009. 
